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POLICY WATCH
A Right Mix For
Greener FieldsA much-delayed
draft fertiliser policy tries to strike an uneasy balance between the
interests of the farmers and the industry
By
Ranju Sarkar
Union
Chemicals and Fertilisers Minister Suresh Prabhu is a man on the move.
He's criss-crossing the country, brainstorming with farmers, economists,
and fertiliser-industry representatives, seeking their reactions to his
pet project: a long-term fertiliser policy which promises to usher in
reform into one of the most vexing sectors of the Indian economy. The twin
objectives of the policy: to provide affordable fertilisers to farmers
without harming the industry in the process.
A draft policy document chalks out an
eight-year time frame to decontrol the highly-regulated fertiliser
industry and prepare it to cope with the stiff competition that is
inevitable with the removal of quantitative restrictions (QRS) next year.
In this connection, it talks of, among other things, periodic hikes in the
consumer price of fertilisers, replacing the infamous Retention Price
Scheme (RPS), removing existing distribution controls, and a suitable
feedstock policy with an emphasis on liquefied natural gas or LNG (See The
Decontrol Roadmap). It's a path strewn with landmines, given the fact that
the fertiliser industry is inextricably linked with the
politically-volatile agriculture sector. Admits Prabhu, 47: ''In
fertilisers, the stakes are very high. There are far too many conflicting
interests.''
But reforms are long overdue. Says Prabhu:
''This policy should have come 10 years earlier.'' The inadequacies of the
present policies are evident from a rising fertiliser subsidy bill (up
from Rs 9,918 crore in 1995-96 to Rs 13,950 crore in 1999-2000), problems
in sourcing feedstock, imbalance in the use of fertilisers leading to
deteriorating soil conditions and the sorry state of the industry.
Fertiliser production grew by only 1.8 per cent as opposed to 9.3 per cent
in the first-quarter of 1999-2000. With the government reassessing
capacities, most urea majors have reported a sharp decline in
profitability during the first-quarter of 2000, with the profits of
several declining by as much as 44 per cent.
The industry isn't very impressed with the
draft policy. Says Manu Seth, 48, former CEO of Tata Chemicals: ''It's a
good policy framework, but it's vague.'' Some find the pace of reforms too
slow. Avers K.S. Raju, 50, Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Nagarjuna
Fertilisers: ''The time-frame of eight years is terribly long. It should
be done within three years.'' Others such as Pratap Narayan, 69,
Secretary-General, Fertilisers Association of India (FAI), clamour for
immediate decontrol.
Prabhu rules that out completely. ''That is
not advisable,'' he says flatly. Partly, politics is to blame, with the
farming community objecting to any decontrol whatsoever. In any case, he
argues, an immediate and sharp increase in prices will affect fertiliser
consumption and, consequently, agricultural production. Prabhu's clincher:
immediate decontrol will render a majority of the fertiliser industry
unviable.
The Subsidy Burden
The root cause of the sector's problems is
the fertiliser subsidy. Asserts Prabhu: ''Subsidies are inevitable. If we
want to augment agricultural production, we must provide incentives for
people engaged in farming.'' Fertiliser prices are fixed by the government
and the farmers' lobby has successfully prevented realistic increases in
them, thereby pushing up the subsidy bill. Under the RPS-introduced in
1977 to make India self-reliant in fertiliser production-the GOI pays
fertiliser companies the difference between the sale price and the
retention price, which is the price that guarantees manufacturers a 12 per
cent post-tax return on net worth. The retention prices are fixed
unit-wise taking into account, among other things, the cost of the
project, the age of the plant, the feedstock used, and consumption norms.
Unfortunately, with their costs covered,
companies had little incentive to become efficient. Agrees Bibek Debroy,
39, Director, Rajiv Gandhi Institute of Contemporary Studies: ''RPS
doesn't reward efficiency and penalise inefficiency.'' There were also
allegations that companies understated their capacities in order to claim
higher subsidy, a point the industry hotly denies. Counters Narayan, 69:
''The subsidy bill has shot up because fertiliser prices are not being
raised in tandem with rising input costs.''
Indeed, between 1980 and 2000, naphtha and
fuel oil prices have shot up 2,200 per cent, while the landfall prices of
gas have gone up nine times. In contrast, urea prices have increased only
three times. Feedstock prices, incidentally, account for almost 70 per
cent of the cost of production. Points out Pankaj Oswal, 28, Director,
Oswal Chemicals & Fertilizers: '''The best way is to increase input
prices when procurement prices for foodgrains are raised.''
But successive governments have desisted
from such simple solutions and things don't seem to be changing. The draft
policy says there is need for periodic price increases, but remains silent
on the extent and periodicity of the increase.
One thing is clear: RPS has to go. Agrees
C.H. Hanumantha Rao, 52, Chairman of the 1997 High-Powered Fertilizer
Pricing Policy Review Committee (HPC): ''RPS has become unsustainable.''
The High Powered Committee had recommended an alternate system, which the
draft promises to implement in the run-up to total decontrol. The HPC
suggests that the existing unit-wise dispensation be replaced by a uniform
price regime and has recommended a Normative Referral Price (NRP) of Rs
6,050 per tonne for gas-based plants, with units based on naphtha and fuel
oil getting an additional amount for five years till they switch over to
gas.
The urea majors, however, argued that the
cost of feedstock varies from plant to plant because of factors like
transportation costs, local sales tax, and the vintage of the plant. For
instance, natural gas costs Rs 3,600 per 1,000 cubic metres at landfall
point, while the average cost for units along the
Hazira-Bijapur-Jagdishpur (HBJ) pipeline is Rs 4,500 per 1,000 cubic
metres. Insists Narayan:
''A uniform price will create serious price
distortions.''
Fertiliser industry sources say a committee
of secretaries working on a pricing policy has calculated the NRP for
different units. Naphtha-based units whose retention price is less than Rs
11,140 per tonne will be eligible for an NRP of Rs 11,140 per tonne (which
is the weighted average cost of the 11 naphtha-based units under the
existing RPS), while those units whose retention price is more than Rs
11,140 per tonne will get Rs 12,117 per tonne. But this, the FAI points
out, will create more complications. A unit with a retention price of,
say, Rs 11,139 per tonne will get Rs 11,140 per tonne, while a unit with a
retention price of Rs 11,141 per tonne will get Rs 12,117 per tonne.
There's no confirmation of these figures
from the government, nor does the draft policy say anything about how the
NRP will be worked out. Says an economist: ''Unless they tell us what they
specifically have in mind, any debate will be meaningless.''
A Separate Issue
Prabhu, however, says pricing issues are
beyond the scope of the fertiliser policy and will be tackled separately.
''Pricing is a short-term measure; the policy attempts to address
long-term issues,'' he argues. He also assures that the pricing policy,
when it is finalised, will take into account the objections raised by the
industry. But he believes the NRP to be a better alternative. ''The
present system provides no incentives for units to become efficient. This
system will ensure that they do,'' he asserts.
Clearly, a solution to the pricing problem
needs to look at the issue of feedstock as well. The cost of feedstock in
India is higher than in other countries. Naphtha, for instance, costs $7-8
per million BTU (British Thermal Units) against $5-6 per million BTU in
most fertiliser producing countries, while natural gas costs $2.5 per
million BTU against $1 per million BTU abroad. Says Seth: '''You can't
economically produce urea without subsidising naphtha and fuel oil. How
are you going to deal with this problem?''
The policy paper talks about naphtha- and
fuel oil-based units switching over to gas. That won't be easy. For one,
the country is grossly deficient in gas. Against a demand of 110 million
cubic metres per day (MCMPD), the current domestic production is only 65
MCMPD. The government plans to bridge the deficit by importing LNG.
But the use of LNG as feedstock itself is
problematic. None of the six-to-seven proposed LNG projects have taken off
yet. Besides, the cost of LNG is likely to be around 85 per cent that of
the naphtha price. What's more, at $5 per million BTU, LNG costs twice as
much as domestic natural gas priced at $2.5 per million BTU. Points out
Raman Sharma, 40, Finance Director, Oswal Chemical & Fertilizers: ''It
will be as expensive as naphtha, and you would be dependent on
international oil prices.''
The cost of switching over to gas may also
prove to be a deterrent. Typically, units would need to invest Rs 300
crore for the transition. Argues Narayan: ''It's highly doubtful that
financial institutions (FI), which are not keen to fund any expansion
projects, would be willing to fund such projects.'' Prabhu, however, feels
that the old policies are to blame for the attitude of the FIs and plans
to involve them also in the discussions on the draft.
Transition Woes
The HPC report and the draft policy give
companies five years for the shift, during which time they will get a
feedstock differential reimbursement in addition to the NRP. But, industry
representatives argue that if LNG is not available, and the differential
reimbursement is withdrawn after five years, these units will be forced to
run on naphtha and yet bear the capital charges for the switch-over.
''This is tantamount to double penalty,'' argues an industry
representative. Moreover, naphtha prices may fall once LNG is available.
The draft, however, is silent on all this.
There are other significant omissions. For
instance, the policy deals only cursorily with phosphatic and potassic
fertilisers, which are decontrolled. As it is, the present lop-sided
emphasis on subsidising urea has led to its overuse, ruining the soil in
the process. The policy seems to perpetuate this imbalance. Prabhu puts up
a lame defence: ''That comes under the agriculture ministry.'' In any
case, he says, right now the policy is only in the draft stage and the
final policy will be a holistic document. Amen to that.
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