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CORPORATE FRONT: STRATEGY
Can IBP Distil A New Future For ItselfOnly if its marketing network finds the backing of standalone refineries to
supply it with products.
By Ranju Sarkar
Mergers and demergers should hardly faze IBP Co., the
oldest company in the Indian petroleum sector. Way back in 1942, when the Japanese advance
into Burma (now Myanmar) seemed unstoppable, the Rangoon-based company was re-incorporated
in Calcutta. Then, in 1970, the company was turned into a subsidiary of the Indian Oil
Corporation (IOC), before being demerged 2 years later. Now, there will be another
footnote in IBP's 89-year history. This one, however, promises to be the most significant.
For, this marketer of petroleum products desperately needs to
strike a strategic alliance--or even merge--with a refinery. Says S.N. Mathur, the
53-year-old CEO of IBP: "It may be desirable to tie up with a standalone refining
company, such as Madras Refineries Ltd (MRL) or Cochin Refineries Ltd (CRL)." There
are other options, too. IBP could be merged into one of the national oil companies; or,
perhaps, the government could divest its stake to a private-sector oil company; a
combination of the 2 cannot be ruled out either.
One way or the other, IBP has to change. And that is linked
to the imminent decontrol of the oil sector in 2002. Post-decontrol, the government is
likely to disband the current system, where the marketing companies get an assured supply
of products from refineries based on the former's marketshares. In such a scenario, IBP
would find itself a pygmy in the company of its 3 public sector cousins: IOC, Hindustan
Petroleum Corporation Ltd (HPCL), and Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd (BPCL). Why, IBP is
one-twelfth the size of IOC, which is the country's largest oil company. It is also
one-third the size of BPCL, the smallest of the trio. The differentiator: while the trio
has refining capability, IBP doesn't.
Sure, when the Numaligarh Refinery in Assam is commissioned
later this year, IBP--which holds a 19 per cent stake--will receive 1 million tonnes per
annum (MTPA) of petro-products to market. But, post-April 1, 2002, IBP will still have to
find other sources to meet its remaining requirement of 4 MTPA. Obviously, IBP will be
looking at striking an alliance with a refinery. Explains S.C. Mathur, 58, CEO, Petronet
India: "At times, when refining margins are low, marketing margins can provide
strength to a company. An alliance will also enable them to take position in the futures
market and optimise their purchase cost."
The Disinvestment Commission agrees. In its November, 1997,
report, the Commission recommended that the Government of India (holdings: 59.60 per cent)
bring in a strategic partner in IBP by disinvesting 33.90 per cent to an Indian or foreign
oil company. In agreement, the government has stayed IBP's Rs 422-crore public and rights
issues, which would have brought down the government holding in IBP to 50 per cent, and,
more important, jeopardised the disinvestment process.
The proposal is also backed by the Ministry of Petroleum
& Natural Gas, which is contemplating merging IBP with 3 refineries: MRL, CRL, and
Bongaigaon Refinery & Petrochemicals Ltd (BRPL). A 5-member committee, headed by
former Planning Commission member Nitish Sengupta, has been constituted to examine the
proposed merger. Says Devi Dayal, 54, Additional Secretary, Petroleum Ministry:
"Until the Committee submits its report, we can't really comment on it."
But, assuming that the government is seriously considering
the 4-way merger, is IBP the best suitor for the 3 refineries? Maybe not. For one, MRL's
and CRL's refineries are located in South India. But IBP (marketshare: 7 per cent, Sales
Plan Entitlement: 3.80 per cent) has a strong retail presence in North India. Says Sanjiv
Joshi, 28, Analyst, DBS Securities: "Transporting products is not feasible since it
will increase costs and create logistical and infrastructural problems." Mathur,
however, discounts this factor, arguing that locational disadvantages can be tackled by
swapping products with other refining companies.
More worrying is the fact that, post-decontrol, IBP will
emerge as the weakest of the players in terms of marketing. Agrees Abhay Goel, 25,
Assistant Manager (Energy Services), Ernst & Young: "IBP has a weak distribution
set-up. In case of a shakeout, it will be hit hard." True. IBP has only 1,439 retail
outlets, compared to the IOC's 6,723, while BPCL and HPCL boast of 4,363 and 4,310,
respectively. The oil behemoths also have a stronger infrastructure-base than IBP, in
terms of terminals and storage capacities.
That explains why, in December, 1998, CRL entered into a
5-year marketing alliance with IOC. Says K.L. Kumar, 56, CEO, CRL: "IOC offered us
better terms." Likewise, it would be logical for MRL to also tie up with IOC, whose
pipelines already carry the refinery's products. Finally, BRPL's inclusion will not add
much value to the merged entity because its refinery has a small capacity of 2.65 MTPA.
In any case, the combined refining capacity of MRL, CRL, and
BRPL is 16.85 MTPA, while IBP's annual requirement is 5 MTPA. IBP is currently not ready
for such huge volumes. Sure, its requirements will go up once it is able to set up more
outlets--when restrictions on retail expansion are withdrawn--and to make a thrust with
bulk trading. While increased business with the railways, the state transport undertakings
et al will improve IBP's volumes, lack of funds will hamper its efforts to expand its
retailing network. In effect, BT estimates that, by 2002, IBP's annual requirement is
unlikely to go up beyond 7-8 MTPA.
While the flirtation with public sector refineries is on, IBP
has also caught the fancy of newcomers setting up refineries, like Reliance Petroleum
(Reliance), and older joint sector refineries, like Mangalore Refinery. In fact, if the
merger with public sector refineries doesn't materialise, Reliance may emerge as a serious
contender for IBP, since it has the required political clout, spare cash, and business
compulsions to do that. At the moment, Reliance's proposed marketing agreement with IOC
states that, after 7 years, the former will have to sell 50 per cent of its proposed
annual production of 27 mtpa directly to consumers. In such a scenario, a merger with IBP
makes sense. Agrees Ernst & Young's Goel: "If Reliance can acquire IBP, and build
a 3,000-km pipeline network to transport petro-products, it can beat all the other
players." Another scenario: IOC sets up a marketing joint venture with Reliance and
Essar, into which IBP is merged. Meanwhile, hardly oblivious of all the attention, IBP is
building on its strengths in retailing. Despite having the lowest marketshare among the 4
companies, it has the highest throughput per pump in the industry. But it will have to set
up more depots. Poor asset creation is the major reason for the abysmal state of IBP's
margins, which stand at 0.68 per cent, compared to 3.42, 2.55, and 2.88 per cent for HPCL,
BPCL, and IOC, respectively.
But over and above a strategic alliance, IBP desperately
needs a major restructuring. Although its other businesses, like industrial explosives and
cryogenic containers, are self-sustaining, they contribute barely 10 per cent to the
company's turnover. Similarly, Balmer Lawrie & Co.'s--in which IBP holds a 60 per cent
stake--diverse businesses--industrial packaging, speciality chemicals et al--have little
synergy with IBP's core business of marketing petroleum products. Says IBP's Mathur:
"We are examining the possibility of re-organising the holdings, but there's no plan
of any disinvestment. We will try to improve the profitability of these businesses."
That's unfortunate, as a leaner IBP would be better equipped
to take on the might of the Big Three. While the 4-way merger makes sense in principle,
there are hurdles in its implementation. Meanwhile, national oil companies and the private
sector are itching for a slice of the IBP pie. Only after it has found a partner can IBP
think of a high-octane future. |