Mundane Manifestos

By Swati Kamal

They may sound deceptively similar. But they are trying to stamp their own identity on the electorate. Compare the election manifestos of our political parties for Elections 98. Almost all the parties seem to have recognised the vital role of foreign direct investment, privatisation, and the need for the State to withdraw from business. If the Left chooses to be slightly different--the party questions privatisation only when it comes to the insurance, banking, and infrastructure sectors--caution has more to do with its stand than ideology.

Thorny issues, at best, reveal conciliatory tones; at worst, no comments. The Bharatiya Janata Party's (BJP) change of tack is impossible to miss. To the BJP, swadeshi--which earlier meant self-reliance--now denotes India First. Besides, there is no definitive stand on investment in non-priority areas which the BJP wants to restrict--not reject. And a proposal to have a six-month lock-in period for foreign institutional investors has been quietly dropped.

What's more, there is a consensus even on anti-reform measures. All views coalesce around issues like protecting domestic industry, strengthening the small-scale sector, continuing with subsidies, and making capital market regulations more effective. The specific means to achieve the common ends differ. The BJP, for instance, terms the unorganised sector the bhagidari, promising it a development bank and a social security net.

The Congress-I says it will use the Tariff Commission to help industry cope with competition. And while the BJP seeks a modification in the World Trade Organisation rules in concert with other developing nations, the Congress-I would prefer to work with industry to smoothen the transition to an era of free trade.

All the parties are silent on the critical issue of speed. None of the manifestos defines a time-frame for the implementation of the proposals. After all, all coalitions are also alike. All of them have to maintain a fine balance between promises and policies. Between consensus and instability. And between inaction and change.

Disappointment At Davos

By Rukmini Parthasarathy

Annual picnics are always predictable. In recent times, the main preoccupation of such conclaves is Capitalism In A Time Of (Asian) Crisis. And the congregation of politicians, bureaucrats, businessmen, and the odd academic on the ski slopes of Davos, between January 29, 1998, and February 3, 1998, was no exception. Although the theme of the World Economic Forum meet was to define the agenda for the next millennium, the proceedings were dominated by the very current concern of managing the explosion in volatility sparked off by the East Asian financial meltdown.

Amidst this Great Asian Drama, a pared-down Indian contingent was not able to provide much more than a minor sideshow. A prolonged industrial slowdown combined with the steep price tag of a Davos ticket--Rs 4 lakh--limited CEO participation. Only 32 CEOs attended the meet--a sharp drop from the 60-or-so who participated last year.

With Union Finance Minister P. Chidambaram pulling out a week before the conference was scheduled, government representation was confined to cabinet secretary T.S.R. Subramaniam and finance secretary Montek Singh Ahluwalia. Their refrain of policy continuity in the thick of political change and domestic economic stability in the midst of global instability did not cut much ice with international investors. Only 4 per cent of the CEOs present said that they had plans to invest in India. Clearly, if reforms have slowed down, stability and continuity do not add up to much--even in a time of turmoil.

Sins Of (De) Commission

By Swati Kamal

It's a question of pace. While the Industry Ministry desires to tread very slowly, the Disinvestment Commission is keen on pressing the pedal. Ranged at the two ends of the spectrum are an intrepid reformer--G.V. Ramakrishna, 67, chairman of the Disinvestment Commission--and a cautious government. Caught in the middle: conflict and controversy.

The government's recent diktat might debilitate the think-tank set up in August, 1996, to chalk out a disinvestment strategy for the state-owned units and monitor the privatisation process. In the last week of January, 1998, the Industry Ministry notified the specialised body that, henceforth, it need not concern itself with monitoring disinvestment any more, but restrict itself to a purely advisory function. For a body that had only limited powers to begin with, the role of counsellor may be its last.

"We are disappointed," admits Ramakrishna. "We are calling a meeting of the Commission to decide the future course of action." But there is more despair on the Commission's record so far. The Commission has already prepared reports on 43 state-owned companies, and has seven more to finish. But thanks to the ministry, most of the recommendations have piled up--waiting to be implemented. In reality, hardly anything has changed for the largely-ignored Commission.

Will a new Central government mean a new Commission? Privatisation is a politically sensitive issue, and all advisory bodies are likely to end up as political scapegoats--you can always blame it on the Commission--unless they are empowered. The Industry Ministry is perfectly capable of strategising, spearheading, and implementing a disinvestment programme. It does not need a powerless change-agent to help it do so. In such a situation, it is, perhaps, wiser to decommission the Commission.

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