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The Thin Red Line
Russia and Iran favour the Northern Alliance, but Pakistan does not. In its military pact with the front, the US should keep in mind the future power regime.
These days, Abdullah Abdullah makes it a point to correct anyone who refers to the Afghan resistance groups as the Northern Alliance. The articulate foreign minister of the alliance insists that the opposition forces be referred to by their full name: the United Islamic and National Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UINFSA).
It is clever semantics by the ophthalmologist-turned-politician. For in the run up to America's big war against the Taliban, Afghanistan's ruling regime, the front is critical to the US plans. It wants to be a key player in any future regime in Afghanistan. So Abdullah wants to project to the world that its influence is not just restricted to certain pockets in northern Afghanistan.
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| ON THE LOOKOUT: Northern Alliance fighters position themselves at Baghram airbase, north of Kabul |
For America, the front is useful both militarily and politically. Though it controls only 10 per cent of the Afghan territory, the alliance's battle-hardened forces could be used to provide ground intelligence for a US attack. When the war begins, its army could be used to put pressure on Taliban by taking the battle to other fronts.
Politically, the front, which is dominated by ethnic minorities that constitute 40 per cent of Afghanistan's population, could be the key to the stability of any alternative power structure that America and the global community are building up. It could prove crucial in the process initiated by the UN to form an interim government headed by Afghanistan's former king Zahir Shah, now living in exile in Rome.
Last fortnight, it looked as if the front could overwhelm the Taliban's army even before the big war. It made surprisingly rapid advances when it attacked several key targets across the country, including Mazar-e-Sharif, a major airbase in the north. Emboldened, the front issued statements that it was against the US ground troops fighting alongside and would prefer if the US limited itself to decisive air strikes.
By last week, however, the front had lost much of its cockiness. The Taliban quickly regained lost ground and showed it could hold its own. It became apparent that without military intervention by the US and its allies, the front would not be able to defeat the Taliban. Its leaders softened their tone towards a US action. In an interview to india today in Dushanbe, the capital of neighbouring Tajikistan, Abdullah admitted, "A big war is now certain. We need the help of the global community so that the time taken to liberate Afghanistan is far less."(see interview)
What is impressive, however, is the manner in which the front has kept up its image as a credible force even after the assassination of its legendary commander Ahmed Shah Masood just before the September 11 attacks. For years, the charismatic Masood was the face of the anti-Taliban resistance. His death was a mortal blow to the front, but with the US going after the Taliban it quickly regrouped its forces. Anthony Davis of Jane's Intelligence Review, who has covered Afghanistan for close to two decades, says, "Masood's death could have triggered a collapse of the entire resistance. But it is remarkable how the front has weathered it and remains a credible force."
To fill the void left by Masood, the front adopted a collegiate approach. Much like the Queen of England, President Burhanuddin Rabbani continues to remain a titular head. Mohammed Fahim Khan, Masood's trusted lieutenant, has taken his place as defence minister. Like Masood, he belongs to the Panjshir Valley and has served him for over 20 years. In his mid-40s, the short and stocky Khan is considered an experienced commander but does not have Masood's charisma or, as one expert says, "even the military bearing". And he is said to be a diabetic.
Khan, who was commander of the Talukhan front on the northernmost border, was in the doghouse a year ago when the key city fell to the Taliban. At least 700 of the front's fighters perished-the largest in any battle that Masood had fought in the two decades of resistance. But Khan is still the most experienced commander in Masood's army and after his death it was decided he was the best choice. His lack of political ambition also makes it easier for the front to integrate into any power structure that emerges after the war.
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