CORPORATE GOVERNANCE &
BIIRLA COMMITTEE
Managers Must Atleast Deliver Their
PromiseBy Chandra Mohan
Corporate Governance and Transparency have
taken centre-stage importance with the globalisation of Indian Business. Latest in the
chain is the Report of SBI's Committee under Chairmanship of Kumaramangalam Birla.
Kumaramangalam Report is wide ranging in sweep, and deep in
its concern for companies creating long-term wealth for their share-holders. Its
focal-point of action is the Board of Directors: directly and through its Committees. In
its Vision, the Board is:
- Independent of Promoters and Principal Share-holders;
- Eminent as a group in strategic planning and operation; and *
Maintains a keen vigil to ensure transparency.
Independence of Board from promoters and principal
shareholders is proposed through a majority of outside non-executive directors, appointed
by shareholders at the AGM and subject to annual re-confirmation.
Most conclusions are recommended as mandatory. It also
prescribes an elaborate set of mandatory responsibilities for the Board and, D-lines for
mandatory compliance are proposed for companies with equity above Rs.10 crore on April 1,
2000, and for companies with equity of Rs 5 crore on April 1, 2001. Recommendations would,
indeed, cheer the heart of an investor anywhere in the world.
The questions to be answered are: Are the recommendations it
wants to mandate implementable? Who will enforce their compliance in law and in their
spirit? Are the D-lines practicable in a scenario where:
- Half the listed companies do not even furnish their annual
accounts to stock exchanges for years,
- Financial engineering to dupe shareholders is common practice,
and auditors collude in culling creative notes in fine-print;
- Even the most respectable professional companies have been
found indulging in questionable dealings,
- Insider trading is common.
Looking back into the present regulations for corporate
governance:
- Broad-basing of the board has been a principal condition by
financial institutions for ages. Intention was obviously independence and transparency.
- CEO appointment is by the board; contractual, and for a
maximum period of 5-years.
- CEO's are to act under board guidance and supervision.
Thus, while intentions have been all noble all the way, what
has failed is delivery. Will detailed spelling out of responsibilities in their broad
sweep, and making them mandatory help? For the new rules to have meaning, and not end-up
as a mere statements of pious and lotty intent, it is important to ensure that they are
observed in spirit and practice. Flaunting and bye-passing of law and weak enforcement
have unfortunately become a national disease. This aspect becomes all the more important
when corporate managers are recommending laws for their own governance.
My 30-year old innings as a CEO with our own boards, and as a
director on many others, specific suggestions on the Kumaramangalam Committee
recommendations are:
- Board independence and composition:
Independent outside directors in majority and reduction in
the number of boards on which anyone can be a Director, are positive steps. But. is an
election at the annual general meeting (AGM) the answer?
Knowing AGM's and discussions therein, nomination of
Directors in the AGM is not likely to serve the intent. Financial Institutions/ Mutual
Funds/ Banks must actively participate in the nomination. It is their collective voice,
which can ensure compliance, independence of action, and long-term wealth generation.
Their calibre and voice has to carry enough weight in the board to be able to remove the
CEO, if need be. Strong boards alone could remove CEOs like Steve Jobs at Apple (and many
years later even recall him), Jack Smith at General Motors, and Ackers in IBM, when they
failed to deliver.
- Deeper involvement of Outside Directors:
Sound governance can only come through deeper involvement for
which outside directors must have a direct feel of the pulse of the organisation,
untainted by the coloured lens and bias of the CEO and executive directors. This, in turn,
means spending time with lower levels of the organisation. It also only comes through
long-term association, not annual election.
Can one expect outside directors to spend such extended time
with current remuneration? Remuneration will, therefore, require to look again: link to
profits and stock options for wealth creation. Forward looking companies across the world
have started moving in this direction.
For implementability, the possible solution would lie in:
- Beginning with a manageable group of 200 companies. Criteria
could be equity; turnover; and number of shareholders
- Phased introduction of mandatory clauses
- Stiff penalties for non- compliance
- Speedy action for non-compliance. The ethos of management is
seeing and understanding reality as it exists, and then delivering a future that should be
It is, therefore, our duty as managers to, at least, ensure
that laws guiding our own conduct in the next millennium, follow those fundamental tenets
of our profession, and not live in a wishful world of dreams. |