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 | CASE GAME: INTEGRATION
 The Case Of
 Post-Acquisition Strategy
 How will Sunrise integrate the formerly
      state-owned Alco into its umbrella? Ajit Kumar of Accenture, Prashant
      Srivastava of TSM, and Haresh Shah of mergersindia.com discuss. By  R.
      
      Chandrasekhar  Surinder
      Khanna, Chairman and Managing Director of Sunrise Metal Industries, signed
      the cheque with a flourish. It was as though he was signalling the end of
      a traumatic saga that had hogged media headlines for long. Once the cheque
      was handed over at the special ceremony scheduled to be held at the office
      of the disinvestment ministry in New Delhi that evening, Sunrise would
      formally acquire 51 per cent stake in the state-owned Aluminium Co of
      India Ltd (Alco). ''It's a battle well fought,'' Khanna thought to
      himself.
 The government's divesture at Alco had
      attracted controversy in the corridors of power with which the low-profile
      Khanna was not too comfortable. The ideological overtones had overshadowed
      business considerations for months. But, hopefully, all that would soon be
      in the past. Even as the sense of relief among the members of the A-team
      seated around his desk was palpable, Khanna was quick to remind them that
      the real task was only beginning. ''It is time to get down to business,''
      he said. 
        
          | 
              
                | 
 |  
                | The drivers
                  of reorganisation |  
                | Securing the
                  lowest unit cost of aluminium |  
                | Exploiting the
                  benefits of scale economies |  
                | Gaining
                  control over the entire value chain |  
                | Moving from
                  commoditisation to brand-building |  
                | The risks in
                  reorganisation |  
                | Duplication of
                  resources, without cost savings |  
                | Fragmentation
                  of capacities and competencies |  
                | Accumulation
                  of organisational fat |  
                | Loss of touch
                  with the customer |  
                | 
 |    |  Acquisitions were not new at Sunrise. The
      company had consciously avoided organic growth in pursuit of its goal of
      becoming 'the lowest-cost producer of metals'. It had interests in copper
      and zinc, in addition to aluminium, and had extensive refining facilities
      in interior Maharashtra. As part of consolidating its position in the
      high-end aluminium market, it had taken over Surabhi Aluminium in Chennai
      three years ago. The purchase of a majority stake at Alco
      would now give Sunrise access to captive mines, refining, and smelting
      facilities, and also a power plant at a sprawling estate in Orissa.
      Sunrise would soon become the third-largest player in the upstream range
      of standard and specialty alumina products targeted at the growing markets
      of refractories, ceramics, electronics, and electricals. The company would
      also become the second-largest manufacturer of rolled products targeted
      primarily at burgeoning industry segments such as building,
      transportation, consumer durables, packaging, and telecommunications. ''We have moved one step forward in the
      value chain,'' said Naveen Chintan, Director (Business Development),
      excitedly. ''Of course,'' agreed Khanna. ''But,'' he added a note of
      caution, ''if costs go out of control, we will be moving two steps
      backward. So, we had better watch out.'' ''This is an opportunity to replicate our
      success with Surabhi,'' said Vidur Chalapathi, Director (Operations), who
      had not only overseen the merger of Surabhi with Sunrise, but also had
      managed a quick turnaround of Surabhi, which had been making losses prior
      to its takeover by Sunrise. ''Let us not forget, Vidur, that the context
      is different,'' said Ashwin Narayan, Director (Finance). ''The merger of
      Surbahi gave tax benefits to Sunrise. And the cost structure was
      manageable because Surabhi had still not exhausted the long-term statutory
      benefits associated with a greenfield project. Alco, on the other hand, is
      profitable although its costs are high. Surabhi was a small but integrated
      unit. In contrast, Alco is several times bigger.'' ''But Vidur is right about the learnings,''
      said Vishnu Vardhan, Director (hr). ''We have tightened the operations at
      Surabhi. The unit costs are down by 30 per cent in two years. There is a
      renewed focus on efficiency, quality, and customer service. In fact, we
      have used those benchmarks to improve our operations at Aurangabad. I am
      sure we can replicate our success on a larger scale at Alco and make it
      more profitable.'' ''We have taken over Alco not just to run
      it profitably, but use it as a platform to take on the international
      market,'' said Rakesh Mathur, Director (Marketing). ''Cost control is a
      crucial plank for us. Costs in a commodity business like aluminium can be
      controlled only through economies of scale. We now have scale. But the
      disadvantage is that all our aluminium units are far flung. Can we
      eliminate duplication of resources and rationalise common costs in such a
      situation?'' ''It would be good to work towards a
      situation where all aluminium-related operations are brought under one
      single umbrella that gives it a focus,'' said Vardhan. ''It means
      merger,'' said Khanna. ''There are two reasons why I have some
      reservations. Once we merge Alco with Sunrise, we would invariably have
      government nominees on the parent board. I would rather have the
      government's role confined to the operations of Alco alone. Second, Alco
      is a high-cost unit. I would first concentrate on reducing costs and
      bringing its operational benchmarks on par with Sunrise before thinking of
      a merger. After all, Alco has a baggage. Integration becomes far easier
      when there are common business drivers.'' ''There are several costs that are out of
      control at Alco,'' said Narayan. ''The workforce, for one. It is 45 per
      cent higher than our norm. We can, of course, offer VRS, but there is a
      pre-emptive clause that runs for a year. And then, electricity, which is
      our major raw material. The cost of captive power at Alco is about Rs 3
      per unit, which is 60 per cent higher than that of Sunrise. And the
      capacity utilisation of the plant-a critical cost element in a commodity
      business-must be ramped up. There are also large social overheads at Alco.
      Township management, for example, is a non-core activity. It must be
      outsourced. There is also the Cost Of Poor Quality (COPQ), which is higher
      by about 65 per cent. My point is that a merger with a large but
      poorly-run plant like Alco might impact negatively on the overall
      operations of Sunrise. That is a risk we should avoid.'' ''In fact, in my view, we should break up
      each activity in the value chain into an independent strategic business
      unit,'' said Mathur. ''The focus is different. Mining requires optimum
      utilisation of capacity. Smelting and refining require not only
      technological sophistication but also continuous monitoring of costs.
      High-end products require brand building and customer focus.'' ''An immediate fallout of the strategic
      business unit (SBU) structure is escalation of costs,'' said Khanna. ''An
      SBU, therefore, hardly fits in with our low-cost ambition. A merger, on
      the other hand, gives us the advantage of size, which is in tune with our
      global aspirations. We can leverage size to acquire new units-locally and
      overseas-and grow bigger with each passing year.''  Readings List
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