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BT DOTCOM: COVER STORY
The Death Of A Shooting Star
Indya.com flared brightly and briefly. But
was the passing of Indya's noisiest dotcom a News Corp effort to recover
some of its millions?
By Vinod
Mahanta
WHAT
A SHORT, STRANGE TRIP, IT'S BEEN
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November
12, 1999
Sunil Lulla joins Microland Group as president of its new global
internet venture
February
29, 2000
URL indya.com launched showing an unfinished picture
April 16, 2000
Indya.com launched formally
September 13, 2000
News Corp. takes 33 per cent stake for Rs 200 crore
December 30, 2000
Indya buys Net2travel in a swap deal
March 22, 2001
Indya kicks off initiatives to promote chat services
April 3, 2001
News Corp. hikes stake in Indya by 10 per cent
June 4, 2001
Hyundai ties up with Indya.com to promote Santro
June 28, 2001
Indya winds up Hindi channel
June 29, 2001
First downsizing at Indya. Sixty people sacked
August 2, 2001
Star acquires 98 per cent of Indya, pays Rs 48 crore
August 8, 2001
Offline ticketing company Bigtree Interactive acquired and launched
as Indyatickets
August 24, 2001
Second round of downsizing in Indya. Net2travel closed
September 2001
Sunil Lulla puts in his papers, top management follows
October 31, 2001
Star refocuses Indya, announces third downsizing. Only 25 people
retained. Pink-slip party follows.
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THE
NUMBERS
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Employees
240 (peak figures)
Highest salary paid
More than Rs 50 lakh (p.a.)
Valuation on
September 13, 2000 $150 million
Valuation on August 2, 2001
$15 million
Investments made in Indya
$53 million
Revenue-to-cost equation
Rs 50 earned for every Rs 300 spent
Key investors
News Corp., Pradeep Kar, Chase Capital
Main Revenue Streams
Ads and e-rentals
(70 per cent); Indyatickets (10 per cent); rest from e-commerce,
subscription for astrology, and yellow pages
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It all ended
like it began-with a celebration. "Let not the internet bubble get
the best of us," said the invitation. And so on November 2, 2001,
more than 150 staffers, past and present, streamed in to Café Indya, the
roof-top cafeteria of dotcom upstart Indya.com in the leafy suburb of
Koramangala, Bangalore.
Amid much laughter, much reflection,
backslapping and quiet regret, one of the largest pink-slip parties ever
seen in India's tech capital got under way. They caroused, and they drank.
They would have carried on until the sun came up, but in deference to
Bangalore's legal ban on partying after 11 p.m., they shut down early.
There was Sunil Lulla, 34, now ex-CEO, the guy with the love for socks and
the big splash. "The camaraderie was just great," says Lulla of
the going away party. There was networking mogul Pradeep Kar, 37, whose
millions got Indya.com started in its quest for dotcom supremacy just
about 13 months earlier. That's all it took: a year-and-a-half. Internet
time, as we know now, severely crunches reality.
For a dotcom that for a while cornered every
worthwhile Indian billboard, filled full-pages with smart advertisements
and convinced The Times of India to forgo its 163-year editorial
traditions and make its front page available for an Indya ad-all part of a
big-bang launch that cost a cool Rs 4.5 crore-the reality came up
particularly quickly. Only 25 people remain at Indya today to serve their
new master, Rupert Murdoch's Star TV, which is converting the loud,
splashy portal into a simple adjunct to its television business. As we
reported earlier (See Purveyor of Dotcom Energy Dies, BT, November 25,
2001), Lulla, the top management and most employees-95 in all-are moving
on.
The boom was first lowered on October 31 when
all heads of department were called in to Sunil Lulla's office and told
three things: that he was resigning, that the entire management team had
resigned, that Star had a different business perspective. He also
announced the downsizing.
Later that afternoon, the entire staff
gathered at Café Indya to hear Gary Walrath, Star Group's Executive Vice
President, sound the dirge. "It's a hard thing to say," a grim
Walrath, told the stunned gathering. "Indya is a great brand, which
had gone to great heights in the past 18 months." And then came the
simple rationale. "But if $6 is being invested for every $1 we earn,
then I have to take (some) rational business decisions. "It wasn't a
reflection on any business team of on Indya.com per se,'' he explained, it
was just the way the market was. The meeting lasted 40 minutes and at the
end of it, at least the months of uncertainty and rumour were over.
Here A Million, There A Million
How did a company with a war chest of $53
million (more than Rs 200 crore) bite the dust so soon? After all, market
leader Rediff has been going strong for four years and promises a
break-even by the first quarter of 2002.
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"When
it came to the internet business, Star was not willing to do
it."
Sunil Lulla, CEO, Indya.com |
"The revenue from Indya did not justify
the money being poured in, and it appeared that things would not change in
the long-term," Sunil Rajshekhar, head of Star's new media and
convergence division and Indya's new boss, told BT. That's something many
Indyans, as former employees are called, don't agree with. They say the
company was looking at a break-even in early 2003. That was clearly
something Star wasn't willing to risk in the nuclear winter of the tech
age.
"As long as Star were investors they
were fine with it, but when it came to running an internet business, they
were not willing to do it," says Lulla. He announced his intention to
quit in the middle of October when it seemed clear that Star wasn't keen
on allowing him to implement an offline survival strategy. Now, it's
crystal clear. "We see Indya as Star's face on the internet,"
declares Rajshekhar. That means it will carry Star programmes, offer
webcasting and be used to interact with Star's viewers. Period.
The precursor to Star's takeover of Indya was
promoter Pradeep Kar's decision in July 2001 to move out of what he once
called his "killer portal". Insiders say Kar sold out his more
than 50 per cent stake for the money-Star paid $10 million (Rs 48 crore).
Others say Kar was called in to Star's office in Mumbai and
"forcefully requested" to sell out. Despite repeated requests,
Kar did not speak to BT.
From Kar's point of view, the exit made
sense. He was getting good money after all. But why did Star take over?
After all, it had bought a 33 per cent stake in Indya in September 2000 at
a now-humongous $50 million. Star bought the stake from, among others,
Pradeep Kar, ICICI Venture, Chase Capital, UTI, SBI Mutual Fund, Birla
Mutual (a pretty impressive list by any standards, which should tell you
how many bought into the dream). Only, Indya was then valued at $150
million. Today, it's worth no more than $15 million.
Insiders tell BT that a large part of Indya's
$53 million (Rs 249 crore) war chest is unused, supposedly more than $30
million (Rs 141 crore). The theory goes that Star invested $10 million (Rs
47 crore) more to salvage what it could from its contributions to Indya's
still-substantial kitty. Only 2.5 per cent of Indya's stake is now not
with Star. That's held by the Pearl group from Mumbai, makers of the Pearl
Pet brand of kitchen plastic containers, who disagree with the current
valuation.
The Power Of Hindsight
"Indya tried to do in four months what
Rediff did in four years," says a former employee as he discusses
Indya's bold, early days. It was quite late when Kar, who made his fortune
connecting computer networks, decided to jump into the bloom of the dotcom
era.
But Kar, a consummate networker, moved at a
frenetic pace. In September 1999 he dropped into Lulla's residence on
Mumbai's tony Napean Sea Road and within minutes had himself a first-rate
CEO (As General Manager of MTV India, Lulla had turned around a seemingly
moribund channel).
He put together a team of achievers-some of
them earning annual salaries of Rs 50 lakh-scooped up some IIM-Calcuta
toppers and talked to top quality investors. Among them: John Sculley,
ex-CEO of Apple computers, Vinod Khosla, the super VC from Kleiner Perkins
of the US, Rajat Gupta, CEO of consulting major McKinsey, Pavan Nigam,
co-founder and CTO of Healtheon and Sanjay Parthasarthy, Vice President of
Microsoft. Just listen to what they had said then. "A great portal
will help us increase both utility and usage of the internet in
India," said Khosla. "Indya.com has the potential of being just
that definitive portal." James Murdoch (media moghul Rupert's son)
asserted it was a "significant step for Star to partner with Indya to
build a global internet brand".
The company quickly moved into hyper mode
during the latter half of 2000. "Yes, we rolled out the site quickly
because the market was full of significant players and in full heat,"
admits Lulla. Staff strength reached 240, around 40 alliances were sewn
up, and travel portal Net2travel.com was acquired in a stock swap. Like
all portals, the focus was on eyeballs, and more eyeballs. An IPO was
targeted for December 2000.
On A Short Fuse
During this time, Indya's biggest attraction
as an employer was also its biggest problem as a business: its burn rate.
A swank office, the big salaries, the bigger team and the occasional
indulgence-like the male strippers called in for a women's day party.
But it was becoming apparent to Lulla that
there was no way Indya would ever get enough ads. The focus quickly
shifted from eyeballs to revenues. By then the dotcom doom was in full
flow and investors were jittery.
The IPO dreams quickly dematerialised. In its
first round of downsizing, Indya asked 60 people to leave, mainly from the
content and technology teams. Restrictions were placed on travel and
telephone expenses and a floor was vacated. The travel channel's expansion
plans were shelved. "The intention was to build a significant
(online) travel business, but later the focus was on cost-cutting,"
says Rajiv Vij, former partner of Net2travel.com. "This despite
transactions peaking at 700 a day."
Meanwhile, the astrology channel turned pay,
yellow pages were launched in a desperate attempt to make some money, but
the writing was on the wall.
By May 2001, well into the downturn, Star had
dropped its plans for Star-I, its globe-straddling internet effort. And by
July, Kar decided he had run his dotcom race-and lost.
So what went wrong? Actually, not too much.
Indya misjudged the dotcom era, but then so did everyone else. There
wasn't even anything wrong in doing so much, so fast. But Kar did enter
the race too late, then burned too much money trying to make a splash. The
burn rate finally became horribly unsustainable. In the end, though Indya
still had lots of money, it was just an unbusiness-like way to run a
business. Its era was done.
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