BUSINESS REVIVAL
Where There Is Political
Will
PSUs in trouble should get the same
treatment as sick private companies: change of promoter, induction of a
professional board, and an empowered CEO.
By Pradip
Chanda
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Pradip Chanda, Turnaround
Consultant |
A reader has
posed me a question: can the principles applicable to reviving
privately-managed companies be applied to public sector units (PSUs)? The
answer is yes, provided there is political will.
If the government accepts that it has failed
in its role as promoter-cum-manager and must therefore relinquish control
of public sector corporations and hand over the management to a
freshly-inducted board and a duly empowered CEO, there is no reason why
PSUs cannot be turned around.
Having said that, it is pretty obvious that
neither the Central nor the state governments are in a position to give up
control. For they do not have control in the first place. The bureaucrats
do. Will the bureaucrats change? Prime Minister Vajpayee is reported to
have said, ''To avoid one mistake, they are willing to commit 100 more. I
have come to the conclusion that it would be easier for me to change
rather than trying to change the bureaucracy.'' (Hindustan Times, Nov 10,
2001).
Now, let's backtrack a bit to understand the
case of PSUs. The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1948 delineated the role
of the State in industrial development both as an entrepreneur and an
authority. Successive policy resolutions strengthened the bias towards the
public sector, giving it a strategic role in the economy.
At a point of time when the country's
industrial development lagged far behind the world's, and the capital
market in the country was in its nascent stages, most policy makers
believed this was necessary. Their reasoning was that private capital
could not fund large scale investments in essential infrastructure
industries such as power, steel, and transportation.
The PSUs had everything going for them.
Funding, prima facie, was not a problem. The staying power of the
promoter-the State-was not an issue. By definition, PSUs were given
strategic assets and monopolistic strangleholds on markets-an Utopia of
sorts, where private promoters would have been able to create world-class
corporations. And in a world recovering from WW ii at that point in time,
many entrepreneurs, given similar resources, would have created
transnational giants.
Out of the three key elements required to
succeed in business-vision, resources, and organisation-the Indian state
was able to provide only one: resources. Its contribution, in terms of
both vision and organisation, were lacking.
At some stage, the government as the promoter
was unable to get PSU managers to buy into the vision that the purpose of
the PSUs was to create wealth from the assets entrusted to them.
Consequently, each PSU appears to have
defined its own goal, often missing the wood for the trees and ending up
as a mere provider of jobs.
The other problem was organisation. Despite
well-meaning measures such as creating boards with invitees from the
private sector wherever possible, a transparent selection process, and
substantial investments in training and development programmes, the
government was unable to attract the right talent owing to an unrealistic
remuneration policy. There have been some exceptions. A few PSUs,
fortunate enough to have a CEO with a vision, have done reasonably well,
proving once again the axiom that businesses do not fail; people do.
PSUs in trouble should get the same treatment
as sick private companies: a change of promoter, the appointment of a
professional board, and the induction of a new CEO empowered to bring in
the changes required to deliver what these PSUs should have been
delivering all along.
Given the deeply entrenched sloth in our PSUs,
such changes can only happen through privatisation. I, therefore, pin my
hopes on disinvestment.
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