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NTPC's Korba super thermal power station:
Located in Chhattisgarh, it is one of Asia's biggest power
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Admittedly,
distribution reforms hold the key to commercialising the Indian
power sector and converting electricity into just another commodity.
Only then will the sector attract investment flows to meet power
demand. However, investments cannot wait for the sector to mature,
since the demand for power is soaring. Therefore, leading the
government's capacity addition programme are central public sector
undertakings like National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC). In
the 10th Plan period (2002-2007), the private sector is expected
to add a modest 5,000 mw against the central sector, which is
expected to contribute around 17,000 mw, a significant part of
which is being contributed by NTPC.
Fortunately, it is not a case of fools going
where angels fear to tread. Not at least for the last five years,
prior to which collections were of the order of 70 per cent, which
means for every rupee of power sold, only 70 paise was collected.
The receivables were mounting-touching as high as Rs 24,000 crore-and
there was little that the Central Power Sector Undertakings (CPSUs)
could do. The central government then cut a deal with the states
collectively that involved part waiver of the interest component
and deferred payment of the outstanding dues. In return, the CPSUs
were allowed access to the states' till-that is, the states account
with the country's central bank, the Reserve Bank of India-in
case of default on power purchased by the utilities. And, lo and
behold, the defaults vanished, and overnight collections vaulted
to a stunning 99 per cent.
With this gilt-edged safeguard, CPSUs are
better placed than the private sector in the business of capacity
addition. For one, it significantly insulates the CPSUs from recovery
losses, which are about 35 per cent. The private sector, on the
other hand, has to factor in the losses while financing its projects.
However, the CPSU's ability to finance projects is also limited,
as lenders look to the cash flow volume to secure their debts
(apparently, the fact that they can tap the state's account with
RBI is not a big assurance). Hence, while NTPC is capable of adding
around 22,000 mw in the 11th Plan period (2007-2012), based on
its ability to service its debt liabilities, it is currently targeting
only around 17,000 mw.
THE LURE OF SPOT MARKETS
Why short-term contracts are more lucrative.
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Traditionally,
generators in the country that sell power to the utilities
have earned a fixed return set by the regulator. This, since
power procurement has hardly occurred on a competitive basis
owing to legacy issues that have destroyed the commercial
viability of the sector. Therefore, only government-driven
investments are the dominant ones. For example, NTPC's plants
account for 25 per cent of the country's supply and all of
its plants earn a flat 14 per cent return on equity. But in
the newer plants, NTPC is going 'merchant'-that is, not tying
up capacity to long-term contracts that would immediately
attract the regulator's eye. So far, it has quietly shored
up 2,000 mw of capacity that will mature in a few years. This,
in turn, will spur the short-term power market development,
where returns are not capped.
Unlike NTPC, some of the states like Orissa that prudently
added capacity are able to earn huge bounties from buyers
like Uttar Pradesh, where demand vastly outstrips supply.
Uttar Pradesh sometimes pays as much as Rs 5 per unit, as
against Orissa's generation cost of Rs 1.50 per unit. Interestingly,
the transaction price is dependent on not only the demand-supply
position, but also regulatory intervention. The prevailing
deficit situation often results in several states over-drawing
power beyond their schedule. This results in the frequency
dipping below the critical level. To avert this situation,
the regulator imposes stiff penalty on those who over-draw
power. This, incidentally, sets the alternate cost of purchase
of power for the deficit utility. Evidently, NTPC is setting
a trend where a part of its new capacity is being created
on a merchant basis. And with the distribution sector maturing,
more generators may follow suit. And power sector stocks
will no longer have to suffer their traditional description-orphan
stocks.
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Courting Private Producers
With power demand rising at around 8 per
cent annually over the last two years, led by industrial demand
that has grown at 11 per cent a year, the power ministry is targeting
around 62,000 mw capacity addition in the 11th Plan period. (Just
for the record, India has an energy shortage of 7.8 per cent and
a peak shortage of 11.23 per cent.) Of this, CPSUs are expected
to contribute 31,000 mw, the state sector 20,000 mw and the private
sector, the remaining 11,000 mw.
And this forms the basis of the central government's
argument for promoting private capacity addition. Over the last
two years, the vehicle for this promotion is a multi-disciplinary
group, called the Inter Institutional Group (IIG), involving governmental
financial institutions. Here, only those private projects with
competitive tariffs were taken up and their last mile problems
solved. Subtle arm-twisting became commonplace-states were often
told that if they delayed signing up competitive projects, they
would be denied additional power supply from the central generating
stations.
This process lost its relevance when the
problems of the 'pre-cooked' competitive projects were addressed
one way or another-several projects were turned away when they
failed to line up gas supplies. There was, however, one project
that did not take off owing to the perception of the promoters'
credentials. The financial institutions refused to finance a 1,000-mw
project promoted by Jaiprakash Industries when they found that
the equity component in the project fell below the 30 per cent
mark during the course of the project. The FIIs, having burnt
their fingers with the Enron-promoted Dabhol project, were not
willing to take chances. At final count, the IIG process saw through
around 8,000 mw of private capacity.
In what appears to be the next level of intervention,
the central government is undertaking a key, yet 'soft', aspect
of project development-obtaining the various clearances like land,
environment, domestic captive mine, and tying power sale with
several states. However, the role is limited to that of facilitation
and not that of providing any financial comforts to mitigate the
payment risks posed by the purchasing utilities, and that continues
to be the critical issue bogging down the sector. The other salient
feature of this intervention is the scaling up of projects-4,000
mw apiece-in a bid to reduce power costs. The power ministry is
upbeat on the prospects, based on the initial response, which
has seen more than 30 companies buy the Request for Qualification
(RFG) document. Says Power Secretary R.V. Shahi: "The Sasan
and Mundhra projects are very much on schedule. The projects will
be awarded by the end of the year." While the Madhya Pradesh-based
Sasan project will operate on domestic coal, the Gujarat-based
Mundhra project is planned to operate on imported coal.
The Tariff Challenge
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NTPC Chairman T. Shankaralingam: The
corporation's plants account for around 25 per cent of the
country's supply |
To be sure, some big announcements have come
recently from the private sector. Tata Power, for instance, has
bid for four mega projects, and has already received the RFG for
the Sasan and Mundhra projects. Anil Ambani's Reliance Energy,
on the other hand, has plans that span nuclear to hydel and envisage
Rs 60,000 crore in investment. However, the litmus test for the
mega projects will be the response to the next stage of the bid
process, where tariffs will be solicited. It is here that the
risk perception of the sector will be truly discovered. "We
have decided against bidding for the ultra mega projects since
the fundamental issue of payment security from the purchasing
utilities has not been addressed. And, it is not as if our appetite
in the power generation business has been whetted," says
Praveer Sinha, Chief Operating Officer, Nagarjuna Power Corporation,
which has already inked a deal to sell power to the Karnataka
state distribution utility power from its proposed 1,015 mw imported
coal-based plant in Mangalore.
The response from one of the bidders is no
less cautious. Says Srinivasa Rao, Country Head, AES (India) Ltd,
a subsidiary of the global power major AES Corporation: "We
have serious concerns about the payment security mechanism as
reforms have not progressed adequately. Furthermore, the government
could have considered several units of 1,000 mw each, as it would
be easier to secure finances for them rather than a single 4,000-mw
project in view of the payment risks involved."
Ironically, it is one of the Centre's reform
measures that will put pressure on the utilities' payment abilities-to
recall, the utilities' deal with the PSUs five years ago, wherein
they secured future power bill payments in lieu of partial waivers.
While the move became a reform driver since payment became a zero-sum
game (either the utilities paid up in full to the central sector
power utilities like NTPC or its owner, the state, would cough
up the payments), matching distribution reforms have not taken
place. Hence, the payment security mechanism for PSUs (which supply
over 25 per cent of the country's power) will put pressure on
the utilities' payment ability for future capacity addition. Furthermore,
the states' finances will now be further strained, since the time
is ripe for redemption of bonds issued to NTPC five years ago
in lieu of their outstanding dues. Every six months, the states
will have to pay around Rs 1,000 crore to NTPC.
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AES' Rao: Has serious concerns about
the payment security mechanism for the ultra mega projects
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In fact, the regulator for multi-state power
transfers, Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC), has
already 'advised' the government that it must identify escrow
capacity, or revenue streams from the utilities' distribution
business, that remain unencumbered. The idea: in case of payment
defaults, the sponsors of the ultra mega power projects will have
direct access to this cash flow. "We are here to facilitate
capacity creation at every level. However, we have voiced our
concern to the government on the need to ensure a robust payment
security mechanism so that the projects are viable," says
A.K. Basu, Chairman, CERC. "We have also told the government
that such large capacities should be entirely contracted by the
utilities on a long-term basis," he added. This typically
mirrors the lenders' views, who finance as much 70 per cent of
the project cost. Says Jitendra Balakrishnan, Deputy MD, IDBI:
"The ultra mega projects are at a preliminary stage and there
are issues relating to payment security and imported fuel that
we are attempting to address."
It is not as if the private sector is sitting
pretty on the ringside. Realising the criticality of fuel in the
final power cost, private sponsors are flocking to the coal-bearing
states, as domestic coal continues to be the best bet, never mind
hurdles like law and order issues. "We have proposals for
as much as 18,000 mw of capacity addition in our state. And a
good part of this capacity will be exported to other states,"
says Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board chairman Rajib Ranjan.
With state power utilities allocating as
much as 80 per cent of their costs on purchase of power, the key
issue facing the sector is the ability to add reasonably priced
power capacity. For the market, higher risk will demand higher
returns. So don't expect the private sector to be swept off its
feet by the suitor at the Centre.
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