Let There Be Light
All that the recent reforms in the power sector
have managed to achieve is to arrest the slide. What is needed
now are measures that move the sector forward.
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Powering India: Plants like this 2,600-MW
unit at Ramagundam have made NTPC the largest thermal power
generating company in the country and among the most efficient
ones in terms of capacity utilisation |
What is common
between the nondescript town of Azamgarh in Uttar Pradesh (UP),
the country's capital Delhi and the Leftist stronghold of Kolkata?
Little except that bootlegged power is available in several parts
of these cities for a price. In a sense, this describes the unmet
aspiration of the common man, who cannot afford the luxury of
private 'back-up' power. Industry, on the other hand, has little
choice but to live with it, having to subsidise farm power that
draws its concession from populist moves that the politician of
the day indulges in to shore up his vote bank. Not only that,
the law abiding consumers across segments end UP subsidising theft,
which often enjoys the patronage of the political class. The outcome
of this regress is that the near monopolistic state-run power
distribution utilities have gone bankrupt. And so, the market
refuses to quench the burgeoning demand, shying away from the
risks of the sector, where paying power bills is a serious issue.
The issue has indeed metastasised-the domestic coal sector, for
instance, has not matured.
Given that, this survey looks at four broad
issues: the efficacy of the reform prescriptions currently under
implementation; issues facing the goverment's attempts to kick-start
the generation capacity addition programme; the irritants in fuel
supply, which is key to affordable electricity, and finally the
politics of power. After all, it is finally our political leaders,
at the Centre and states, who can drive the reform process.
Reform Prescription Or Placebo?
Notwithstanding the various issues facing
the sector, the pall of gloom is beginning to clear, with interventions
occurring at various levels. All the states have set up regulators
and a significant number of them have gone about raising farm
tariffs and reducing industry tariffs; the Centre, on the other
hand, has injected sizeable funds into the state power sector,
improving the technical health, since the states themselves have
little money of their own to do so.
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Reliance Energy CMD Anil Ambani: The
private sector power player has ambitious expansion plans |
Evidently, the sector's downward slide has
been arrested. The question now is whether the pace of reforms
in the power sector is adequate? Or, are we just about running
to stay in the same place? After all, on the face of it, the losses
incurred by the state power utilities are not decreasing (see
The Black Hole). Says an optimistic Union Power Secretary, R.V.
Shahi: "The ongoing reforms are irreversible and the APDRP
(Accelerated Power Development and Reform Programme) scheme, the
Centre's key reform initiative, has been a success story."
Launched in 2000, the APDRP scheme has so
far provided the state distribution sector a grant of around Rs
3,800 crore and a loan of around Rs 1,500 crore. This has enabled
them to achieve a cash loss reduction of around Rs 3,000 crore
over the last four years. During this period, the haemorrhaging
of the utilities has been just about stemmed. Four years ago,
they were losing as much as Rs 29,000 crore annually, rising at
around 10 per cent per annum. During 2004-05, the collective losses
fell to Rs 21,667 crore, though in the previous year, it was even
better at Rs 19,502 crore.
Evidently, the APDRP scheme is only one of
the many factors that have enabled this containment. Argues Power
Trading Corporation (PTC) Chairman and Managing Director, T.N.
Thakur, who was earlier in charge of Power Finance Corporation
(PFC), which is the agency coordinating the apdrp programme: "There
is a need for more institution-based reforms that are carried
out without any conflict of interests and with a singular focus."
PFC is a power sector specific financial institution. It coordinates
with other central power sector utilities like National Thermal
Power Corporation (NTPC) and Power Grid Corporation of India.
This approach is quite unlike that in the roads sector, where
the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) is the nodal agency.
Another criticism of the PFC-led APDRP is
that the gains of the programme remain unsecured and under-leveraged-the
'carrot and stick' programme conceived a few years ago has been
significantly watered down. The obligations on the states to undertake
reform measures have been diluted. As a result, the central government
has no control on the additional revenues arising from the APDRP-induced
improvements. Therefore, an errant administration can fritter
away the gains rather than plough them back into the sector. Admits
Shahi: "The APDRP programme will be restructured shortly
based on improvements suggested by a few government-appointed
expert committees."
STATES AND POWER SUBSIDIES
States continue to cross-subsidise various
consumers, making it harder for reforms. |
State-level power
regulators have been able to wedge open the books of state
power utilities that are owned by their respective state governments.
This has led to the states having to explicitly provide subsidies
to the utility from its coffers, in case it chooses to provide
free power to the farmers or other consumers. To this extent,
the burden on the rest of the consumer segments has abated.
However, there is still the cross-subsidy between various
consumer segments, where the regulator has much work to do.
For instance, while the Andhra Pradesh government has provided
the farm sector a subsidy of Rs 332 crore during 2006-07,
the sector also enjoys a cross subsidy of 480 crore, paid
for by other consumers like industry. On its part, the central
government has set in place a powerful instrument to curb
this-the tariff policy under Electricity Act, 2003. The policy
forces the state regulators to reduce the cross subsidy to
20 per cent of the average tariff over the next five years.
This means that the prevailing trend of around Rs 4.70 per
unit tariff band between the highest and the lowest tariff
must be pared sharply to around 60 paise, corresponding to
an average consumer tariff of around Rs 3 per unit. It remains
to be seen whether the regulator implements this regime, and
what if it doesn't. |
The Regulator And Reforms
Another key reform driver is the regulator.
While state regulators have ensured tariff rationalisation over
the last seven years-altering tariffs for different consumer segments
in a manner that they reflect the cost of supply-the pace of development
here is debatable. Furthermore, it is not as if the regulators
have behaved as mere calculating machines, using economic principles
to arrive at tariffs. Several of them have actually indulged in
an undesirable habit of creating 'regulatory assets'-a euphemism
for procrastinating tariff hikes-thus blunting the very tool that
can drive the political system to aggressively undertake measures
like theft control (such losses are as high as 15 per cent in
several states), or deployment of more funds to reduce the technical
losses that are between 15 and 20 per cent. If the technical and
theft-related losses were to be quickly addressed, hefty hikes
would not be required.
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Power Secretary Shahi: Is optimistic
about reforms and feels that the ongoing ones are irreversible |
There is, however, one area where the state
regulators have failed to seize a key opportunity to accelerate
reforms. The recently enacted electricity law, Electricity Act,
2003, allows the state regulators to implement 'open access'-that
is, allow bulk consumers to escape the tyranny of the existing
supplier, the state distribution utility, which burdens him not
only with the farm and domestic subsidy bills, but also the inefficiencies
of the system. However, there is a price to pay, namely a surcharge
equivalent to the prevailing cross-subsidy burden. Still, there
is adequate flexibility provided in the computation of this surcharge,
and rather than enabling the migration, most of the regulators
have devised formulae that render migration unviable.
Even in cases where the industrial consumer
is migrating from the utility supplier to his own captive unit
(and which is also feeding a sister industrial unit), the regulator
has been able to do little about the 'vindictive' attitude of
the utility. In some cases, the utilities, upset about losing
customers, have refused to offer 'back-up' power in case the captive
units fail or undertake scheduled shutdowns for maintenance. One
such case in West Bengal went to the High Court and was decided
in favour of the consumer. But it is learnt that the utility is
planning to approach the Supreme Court. This unwillingness on
the part of the utility to let go reflects its dependence on bulk
consumers.
Not surprisingly, then, industry continues
to add captive capacity. So far, of the 40,000 mw-odd capacity
added (that's a third of the utilities' generation capacity),
a significant portion operates on expensive fuels like naphtha.
With the result, close to 30 per cent of this capacity is idling.
Having learnt it the hard way, industry is now setting up domestic
coal-based captive capacity.
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PTC's Thakur: Feel more institution-based
reforms are needed, but without any conflict of interests |
Short-circuiting Reforms
While the state regulators have reined in
populist measures like free power, milder forms of populism continue
to be perpetuated. How else does one explain the expensive, short-term
power purchases by power deficit states like up, where consumers
do not even pay their ordinary bills. While in most states, the
utilities are able to afford the annual power purchase costs,
fact remains that the short-term, high-cost purchases that cannot
be recovered from the consumer soaks into the gains that are realised
by Central measures like APDRP. For instance, up has purchased
power at as high as Rs 5 per unit, while its peak tariff is a
little over Rs 4 per unit.
Fortunately, at present, such power is only
around 2.5 per cent of the total power sold in the country. However,
in time to come, this loophole needs to be plugged. But not in
the manner that the central regulator has gone about it. Instead
of letting market forces of demand and supply operate, the central
regulator has capped the trading margins at 4 paise per unit,
apparently in an attempt to keep the consumer tariff in check.
Clearly, the answer to the ills of the sector lies in reforming
the state distribution sector at a furious pace, and that means
reducing theft through strict regulations that are implementable,
and upgrading distribution assets in a manner that the highest
standards of monitoring are adopted. And, to achieve this efficiently,
the sector requires to be quickly depoliticised.
Further, to ascend the reform scale, data
is a critical tool. Interestingly, Centre's data collation efforts
on the state power utilities is representative of this issue.
While the Centre has collated the subsidy paid by the state governments
and gone on to show that the burden has dropped-from Rs 14,595
crore in 2001-02 to Rs 11,016 crore in 2004-05-indicating that
consumers are beginning to pay what it costs to serve them, this
does not represent the total picture. The statistics do not factor
in the indirect subsidy (termed 'tariff compensation') paid by
the state governments to specific consumer segments such as the
farm and domestic sectors. With around 30 per cent of the consumer
base (read: farmers) not being metered, but charged a flat rate
based on the power of the pump sets, data integrity remains a
serious casualty.
|
Power Grid CMD R.P. Singh: 'Connecting
India to power' is the motto of this utility responsible for
transmission |
While there is little to argue on the issue
of 'repair or replace', in the context of distribution sector
reforms, clearly privatisation is not a panacea for the sector's
ills. Orissa's attempt to privatise its distribution utility was
marred by the risks posed by the regulator. At the end, AES Corporation,
a global power major, exited the business a few years ago. Says
Anil Sardana, Managing Director, North Delhi Power Limited (NDPL):
"It is important to recognise that the 'one-size fits all'
approach cannot be adopted in the distribution business. Depending
on the profile of the distribution zone, the correct option needs
to be exercised. It could be the franchisee model, cooperative
model, or something else."
In fact, a few years ago, NTPC attempted
to take over the Kanpur distribution zone in up. However, a change
of heart happened after it took stock of the law and order situation.
For, key to commercialising the power business lies in putting
an end to the sizeable extent of theft. For, instance, 'commercial'
losses in Delhi were 35 per cent when NDPL took over a part of
the distribution business four years ago. Today, this figure has
been pared to 15 per cent. Technical losses, on the other hand,
were 18 per cent at the time of privatisation. Currently, it is
around 15 per cent. "Key to privatisation is the need to
bring about political consensus across party lines on the issue,"
says Sardana. Two years ago, Karnataka, Haryana and Rajasthan
were actively considering the possibility of privatising the distribution
utilities, but subsequent changes at the helm-either leadership
or party-have put the process on the back-burner.
Evidently, as far as reforms are concerned,
we are still running to stay at the same place. Time we moved
on.
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