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"The key issue is of tiering and having
a product in all segments" |
Paul
Jacobs doesn't look like a man
who is contemplating breaking his company into two, as he admitted
in mid-June that he would if it were necessary (the company faces
an investigation over anti-competitive practices in Europe; competitors
such as Nokia, Ericsson and Texas Instruments allege that it bundles
its two offerings, chips and patent licences in such a way that
makes competing all but impossible; for more, see Two Companies
Or One? on page 94). Coincidentally, the company that faces a
Microsoft-like investigation formed an alliance with the latter
in May (see Microsoft + Qualcomm on page 94) that could, if all
goes well, help both companies in areas where they are on weak
ground, Microsoft in the area of mobile telephony software, and
Qualcomm in the area of a converged communication, computing and
entertainment platform. In many ways, these are but two more chapters
in the continuing saga of Qualcomm, a technology powerhouse that
hasn't always had the better-end of policy and regulatory developments.
For instance, WCDMA (Wideband Code Division Multiple Access),
a standard on which Qualcomm collects royalties (as it does on
CDMA itself), was expected to be at the core of third generation
(3G) mobile telephony networks and handsets (phones), but with
Europe picking the 2.1 ghz spectrum for 3G, this was not to be.
At that frequency, WCDMA doesn't work very well (it does at 450
mhz) and consequently, isn't economically viable, one reason why
European telcos have gone slow on 3G. For the record, Flash-OFDM
(Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing), a 4g (fourth generation)
technology provides a better alternative, and in mid-2005, Qualcomm
acquired the company behind this technology, Flarion.
In India, too, Qualcomm hasn't had it
easy. Jacob's recent visit was to defuse a budding crisis over
royalty payments (which are perceived to be too high). The CEO
of Qualcomm met with Telecom Minister Dayanidhi Maran, Tata Group
Chairman Ratan Tata, and Reliance Infocomm's Anil Ambani. Jacobs
is clear that India is a key market for Qualcomm (it accounts
for just 2 per cent of the company's royalty revenues, but this
number will increase) although GSM, a rival standard, is the prevailing
one in India (as it is in most parts of the world). He adds that
the company's investments in India will be "substantial",
explaining that 15 per cent of Qualcomm's employees are Indians.
In an interview with BT's Brian
Carvalho and Krishna Gopalan,
Jacobs put forth Qualcomm's point of view on the issue of royalty
and why he is so kicked about India's telecom story. Excerpts:
Is CDMA it?
It is the technology of the third generation
(3G networks and phones). Everyone today is moving to 3G CDMA
for improved data capability and better spectrum usage. The entire
wireless market is moving that way. Even in a market like Western
Europe, for instance, which is considered a GSM market, 25 per
cent of the handsets sold in December 2005 were CDMA-based.
Would you say that CDMA is suited more
to some markets than others?
Clearly, there are a lot of markets that are
more price-sensitive like India. So, you have to focus and tier
the product in terms of what the consumer wants to buy. For instance,
our brew (Binary Runtime Environment for Wireless) software allows
applications to be downloaded to your phone. This will depend
on how capable your phone is. I think the key issue is that of
tiering and making sure that you have a product that can address
every market segment.
But when a company like Nokia says the
CDMA market has changed (and that it is exiting the business of
making CDMA phones altogether) what does it imply?
Nokia enjoys an 80 per cent market share in
GSM (phones) in the Indian market, which means it can charge higher
prices. It is getting out of the CDMA 2000 market because there
is intense competition. The thing is, there is certainly pressure
in developing markets to get people to focus only on voice when
we know the rest of the world is moving towards data capability.
The world is moving to CDMA. If the rest of the world is moving
towards CDMA, why move to GSM? Again, Nokia has not been successful
in the CDMA 2000 market.
The only place where there is a battle between
GSM and CDMA is in the developing markets, which are very cost-sensitive.
It is true that at the very lowest end of the market, a GSM phone
is slightly less expensive than a CDMA one.
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"The whole world is moving to CDMA" |
Nokia also speaks of the licensing terms
not being acceptable...
I am not sure what they were talking about,
but we do have a contract with them right now. We are in discussions
with them on the renewal of that contract and that is going to
happen next year. There is a lot of competitive positioning going
around those negotiations.
And there are a few people in India who
want the same thing.
That issue got blown out of proportion. If
you look at our royalty rates after netting everything out, you
are talking of about 5 per cent. This means, for a $40 (Rs 1,840)
phone, it would be at about $2 (Rs 92). If the price is halved,
then the royalty is down to about a dollar (Rs 46). The whole
thing is about handset pricing since royalties are paid by the
manufacturers. In exchange for the royalties, we do the fundamental
R&D. They (handset manufacturers) are actually saving money
on the R&D side. Earlier, only the large handset manufacturers
who could do the fundamental R&D had the next generation technology,
which is why you saw only a few manufacturers in the market.
In India, both CDMA operators, Reliance
Infocomm and Tata Teleservices seem to have an issue with your
royalty structure. Surely, there must be some substance to it.
There are various issues that we were negotiating
on. We do the licensing with the handset manufacturers and not
with the operators. If I am a manufacturer and if I want a higher
price, who is the best person to point at (and say, "My price
is higher because we have to pay royalty to these guys.")?
It's us and that is why we are becoming more open about our royalty
rates. What we have been trying to explain to the operators is
that the handset prices are the key thing and we have been driving
down the prices. The royalty is a very small percentage of the
price of the handset. How can prices be reduced? We are investing
more into chipset R&D, which means at the very low end, we
integrate more and more capabilities into a single chip. There
are other things like aggregating volumes for manufacturers covering
a wider range of operators. Overall, we are not here to tell the
operators what to do. We are here to assist them in their business.
How real is the threat when Reliance says
it is considering moving to GSM? Is that logistically possible?
Almost anything is possible if you have money
and spectrum (laughs). We have an issue in India on the way spectrum
is allocated. It does not really provide an operator the ability
to take advantage of CDMA to provide not just voice capability,
but also incremental data services. That is an issue that we are
trying to manage.
Qualcomm + Windows
Will it be the Wintel duopoly
of the 2000s? |
One is a telecommunications
technology company that: holds the keys (or at least most
of them) to 3G and 4G (third generation and fourth generation)
mobile networks and mobile phones; isn't liked by too many
people in its industry; and is being investigated for possible
'monopolistic' tendencies. The other is a software firm that:
is the leader in its industry; isn't liked almost universally;
and which has been, and continues to be pulled up for its
'monopolistic' tendencies. In some ways then, Qualcomm and
Microsoft (for these are the companies in question) are not
dissimilar. Nor are the companies strangers to each other
although a joint-effort to create a mobile enterprise e-mail
offering didn't result in anything of note.
In May this year, the two companies agreed to collaborate,
a process that essentially means the coming together of
the Windows Operating System and the WCDMA platform. Microsoft
would dearly love to own the heart of the mobile phone (as
indeed, it does the heart of the PC), something it has been
prevented from doing so by handset makers like Nokia, Ericsson,
Panasonic, Siemens, Samsung, Sony Ericsson and Motorola
(through Symbian whose eponymous operating system or OS
is used in most mobile phones). And Qualcomm would love
nothing more than to have a serious convergence play, essentially
networks that can handle computing, entertainment and communication,
all at once. Will the new alliance help both causes? It
is too early to tell. And it could well depend on the future
of the Wintel duopoly (Intel has mobile and broadband architecture
plans of its own, especially through its Wi-Max play) and
Qualcomm's own ambitions of becoming a software player of
some power as evident in its strategy with its open development
environment BREW.
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How do you strike a balance in a situation
where you have two CDMA and about six GSM operators in India.
What is the future for you in that context?
The GSM operators will take the WCDMA route
to 3G. We are at an interesting position. All the operators will
be our clients. There was a time in the past where we had the
CDMA versus GSM battle. Clearly, in some of the developing markets,
there is a little bit of that still going on. But people who are
in GSM will move to the WCDMA base (when they go 3G) and we are
here to talk to them and show them how we can help. That happened
in Europe as well. We went into Europe where we were seen as complete
outsiders. Now, we have very good relationships with operators.
They start to understand when you show them the facts that our
business model is very healthy for them. If you look at growth
rates, 3G CDMA is growing at about 30 per cent while the handset
industry is growing at 10 per cent.
Hutchison's 3G model appears to be working.
What has the company done right?
Hutchison is known worldwide as a WCDMA operator.
It is at the vanguard of changing the mindset from selling voice
to selling multimedia. In fact, Hutch in Italy looks at itself
more as a publisher than a wireless operator. It is thinking about
how to do more entertainment, how to get multimedia on the phone,
how to launch TV services on the phone and things like that. Hutch
in the UK took the WCDMA improved voice capacity and went for
the GSM operators with larger bundles of voice minutes and attacked
the pricing of the model. Hence, the GSM operators who had not
gone the WCDMA way had to do that eventually.
Two Companies or One?
It's open season on Qualcomm
in Europe. |
With a full-fledged investigation
by the European union's competition Commission increasingly
looking like a matter of when and not if, Qualcomm's business
model, once feted for its resilience, is under sharp scrutiny.
The company's model is built around two revenue streams:
one, royalty or patent licences on CDMA and WCDMA (the second
is actually built around the first, and developed not by
Qualcomm, but NTT DoCoMo); and two, revenues from the sale
of chipsets that lie at the core of handsets and networks
(that use CDMA or WCDMA). Much like Microsoft was hauled
up for bundling its operating system and applications or
utilities, Qualcomm is being accused of trying to parlay
its presence in both areas into a 'monopolistic' advantage.
When an investigation is launched, in a worst-case scenario,
Qualcomm may have to be broken up into two. The surprising
thing is, the company's R&D is top-notch, and its patents
will likely attract customers wishing to licence them; and
its chipsets are far superior to the competiton's. Ergo,
a break-up, if it happens, won't hurt much.
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About four years ago, you came pretty
close to picking up a stake in Reliance Infocomm. That deal never
went through. Today, would you look at investing in an operator?
We had an infrastructure business in the
beginning and as a part of that, we had to do vendor financing,
which is how we landed up with investments in operators. Since
we were a new entrant then, some of those investments were not
necessarily the best. Our shareholders were giving us a very tough
time and telling us not to invest in operators. We had an awful
lot of pressure from our shareholders. Today, picking up stakes
is certainly not our preferred method of working with operators.
We are doing things where there are new opportunities. For example,
in the US, we have a TV technology called MediaFlo where we actually
purchase spectrum. That is a subsidiary of Qualcomm that will
eventually get spun off. We have announced an $800-million (Rs
3,680-crore) investment into that until break-even.
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