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BUDGET
Budgeting For A Deficit of GrowthPoor Mr Sinha. with the economy settling down to a 5 per cent hindutva rate
of growth, India's finance minister can prevent a fiscal crisis only by backing, through
budget 99, what the BJP doesn't really believe in: liberalisation.
By Swati
Kamal, Rukmini Parthasarathy, & Abheek Barman
SEPTEMBER 30, 1999. The Mid-Year
Review Of The Economy reveals that Budget 99 has not succeeded in reviving the economy
yet. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth is unlikely to cross 4 per cent this year
provided the agricultural sector grows by the projected 4.80 per cent. Corporate sales
have grown by less than 1 per cent in the first two quarters of the year while net profits
fell by 4 per cent. The Centre's borrowings are likely to climb to Rs 110,000 crore as it
seeks to finance a fiscal deficit that has shot up from 5 per cent of GDP in 1997-98 to
6.10 per cent in 1998-99, and is likely to touch 7.50 per cent in 1999-2000. Bankers
forecast a Prime Lending Rate of 18 per cent by March 31, 2000. According to stockmarket
experts, the Bombay Stock Exchange Sensitivity Index, which has already dropped to a low
of 2,700, will fall below the 2,500-mark. Portfolio investors have pulled out more than $2
billion--Rs 9,600 crore at the current exchange rate of Rs 48 to the US dollar--from the
stockmarkets in the past 3 months. Foreign exchange reserves have fallen to $8 billion,
and are shrinking at the rate of $30 million a day, fuelled by a trade deficit of $10.40
billion, which is 3 per cent of GDP. The Union Government will shortly seek a standby loan
of $5 billion (Rs 24,000 crore) from the International Monetary Fund.
The countdown to the Crash Of The Century has begun. No
one--not even the only man who has risen in the Central Hall of Parliament to present a
budget on February 27--seems to be aware of the real calamity that stares India Inc. in
the face.
While growth has all but vanished, Union Finance Minister
Yashwant Sinha is fashioning economic policy under the misguided notion that his enemy is
the fiscal deficit. What is speeding the Indian economy to self-destruction, however, is
not just the growing gap between the Exchequer's revenues and its expenses. It is the
growing gap between the growth that India needs--and the growth that India is getting.
In a sense, growth in fiscal 1998 will ride on a recovery in
agricultural production. Since it shrank by 1 per cent in 1997-98, the rate of growth of
5.30 per cent that the Central Statistical Organisation (CSO) has projected for this year
may be feasible. However, for the prophesy of 5.80 per cent GDP growth--versus 5 per cent
in 1997-98--to come true, the industrial sector must grow by 4.60 per cent. Since it grew
by only 3.50 per cent in the first 9 months of the year, that seems utterly fanciful.
Worse, the slowdown-turned-recession may not, as Sinha may
have hoped, be part of its progress through the classic business cycle of bust-boom-bust.
Had that been the case, reveals an analysis of industrial growth-rates since 1993-94, the
4-year gap between any 2 crests--and any 2 troughs--should have resulted in a
bottoming-out in 1997-98, followed by an upswing in 1998-99. Unfortunately, the rates of
5.60, 6.60, and (a projected) 4.60 per cent, respectively, in the 3 years upto 1998-99
indicate that this is no cycle, but a long-term secular decline.
Blame it on drooping demand growth, both domestic and
global. With the implosion in Asia shrinking global trade, India's exports have collapsed,
shrinking by 2.9 per cent in the first 9 months of 1998-99 over last year. However, the
deceleration in domestic demand is more difficult to explain. Money supply growth
continues to run at over 20 per cent per annum, which suggests that nominal incomes are
growing. Inflation rates are heading downward, which indicates that real incomes are also
rising. Higher agricultural growth should translate into increased spending by farmers.
And yet, private final consumption will grow by just 3.92 per cent in 1998-99.
That is not enough to propel a recovery. Sure, the changing
structure of demand will lead to pockets of growth: infotech, pharmaceuticals, and, more
recently, fast moving consumer goods. But then, these are businesses that, typically, do
not have strong linkages with other sectors. As for the industrial core of the economy, it
continues to shrivel. Between April and November, 1998, the basic goods industries grew by
just 1.4 per cent--down from 6.8 per cent in 1997.
Obviously, the growth impulses generated by the first wave of
the reforms have ebbed. And the economy is settling down to a new trajectory: the Hindutva
rate of growth of under 5 per cent per annum. A reincarnation of the Hindu rate of growth
that acted as unwelcome ballast through the 1970s, this is what Sinha must attack--first.
Unfortunately, Budget 99 threatens to be devoid of an understanding of the bad karma that
stalks the economy. And will, mistakenly, focus only on controlling the deficit, not on
igniting growth. Forgetting, of course, that growth is the most powerful deficit-decimator
there can be.
A preview of Sinha's strategy can be derived from
what S.L. Shetty, 69, Director, EPW Research Foundation says: "The grave was dug by
earlier budgets. Lowering the marginal tax-rate was a suicidal step since it has led to a
considerable reduction in government revenues." So, Sinha will take the easy way out,
and hike some Excise and Customs duties. This will be a dampener to growth, and distort
the markets although it will keep uncompetitive business groups masquerading as swadeshi
groupies at bay.
His myopia is predictable. In the first 7 months of 1998-99,
the Central government's spending rose by 28.50 per cent--the highest in the last 5 years.
However, between itself and Indian Railways, the government consumed 91.40 per cent of
this amount, leaving less than 10 per cent for investment. Moreover, the additional
revenues that were expected to pay for all this haven't come, mainly because the Bharatiya
Janata Party-led coalition forced Sinha to reverse many of Budget 98's sop-cutting and
tax-raising decisions.
By January 31, 1999, with 2 months to go before the books
close, tax-revenues have grown by only 7 per cent. What else could Sinha have expected
with industry responding to the last budget with a growth-rate of 3.70 per cent in the
first 9 months of this year, and services with a rate of between 6 and 7.50 per cent? Even
in 1997-98--no boom year--they grew by 6.60 per cent and 8.20 per cent, respectively.
With the annual projections for these sectors--accounting for
76 per cent of India's gdp--at 4.60 and 6.70 per cent, respectively, it is certain that
Budget 98's forecast of a 19 per cent jump in revenues will fall flat on its face. While
direct tax collections may manage to meet their targets, indirect tax collections have
grown by just 2 per cent (target: 19 per cent). As a result, despite the CSO's
superbly-timed recalculation of the GDP, the fiscal deficit will still overshoot Sinha's
optimistic 5.60 per cent of GDP forecast in Budget 98--and touch 6.10 per cent.
Deja vu. In 1990-91, when the economy tanked, the
fiscal deficit stood at 8.30 per cent of India's GDP. Believes Sunil Bhandare, 57,
Advisor, Tata Economic Services: "The fiscal deficit is worse than (it was) in 1991.
Although it was over 8 per cent then, it at least had some elements of capital
expenditure. This year, it will be close to 7 per cent after knocking off capital
expenditure. We are worse off."
He is not the only one worried about a replay of 1990.
Economist Bibek Debroy, 43, Director, Rajiv Gandhi Foundation, says: "Virtually
everything that happened in the late 1980s is doing so again, primarily on the fiscal
deficit front. It is not back to the 1980s level, but it is inching up. All it will take
is a crisis of confidence of some kind--and everything will be gone."
Sure, the A.B. Vajpayee Administration has been pointing
sanguinely to India's foreign exchange reserves of $30.50 billion as reassurance. This,
alas, is a fig-leaf. For the record, Thailand, South Korea, and Malaysia had swanky
reserves of $38.90 billion, $33 billion, and $27 billion, respectively, in January, 1997.
But they collapsed nevertheless. In any case, the trade deficit of $5.80 billion--compared
to $2.70 billion in 1997-98--augurs ill for India's reserves.
While exports declined by 5.10 per cent in the first 7 months
of the year over the corresponding period of 1997-98, imports grew by 9.40 per cent. As
for the capital account, inflows are dropping: foreign institutional investors sucked out
$661.20 million between April and November, 1998, while foreign direct investment is
sliding. From $862 million in the first quarter of 1998-99, it fell to $388 million in the
second quarter.
Meanwhile, the exchequer has only saved itself some
small change. While the food- and cooking-gas subsidy cuts announced in February, 1999,
will shave off Rs 2,800 crore from the subsidy bill of Rs 1,40,000 crore, disinvestment in
the Gas Authority of India will bring in Rs 180 crore--3.60 per cent of the target for the
year. Of course, North Block also wants a clutch of Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) to
buy their own, or each others' shares, which could transfer Rs 5,000 crore from the public
sector's reserves to the Exchequer--and make a mockery of disinvestment.
None--or even all--of this will be enough. In the first 9
months of 1998-99, the government's market borrowings, net of repayments, were Rs 61,356
crore--4 per cent of India's GDP. This has hardened real interest rates, crowded out
private investment, and squeezed industrial growth. Worries B.B. Bhattacharya, 52, Head,
Development Planning Centre, Institute of Economic Growth: "I'm not hopeful that
industry will recover quickly now that the infrastructure has crumbled. High real interest
rates will deter investment."
Caught between a rock--the looming fiscal fiasco--and a hard
place--the long-term threat of a low-growth economy--what can Sinha do? As with the
crisis, so too can the solution be a re-run of 1991. Eight years ago, the Narasimha Rao
Administration dealt with the situation by unleashing the reforms, and putting India on a
new growth-path. Sinha must do the same. He must:
Remove Roadblocks To Foreign Investment. One reason why
direct investment has shrunk to less than half its size is the mounting distaste for the
way India continues to welcomes capital: by throwing masses of red tape at it. So, Sinha
must introduce measures that will allow projects to be cleared within a week. For
instance, he could dismantle the Foreign Investment Promotion Board, and announce the
formation of an Investment Promotion Council, which will act as a unified approvals
agency.
To ensure that the Council speeds up the process, it should
be armed with a statutory status, and be staffed by both Central and state government
officials. "The government is caught up in all kinds of non-issues such as a level
playing field, competition, tax reforms, buyback, and so on, when we should have focused
on facilitation, expediting clearances, quick financing of infrastructure, and delicensing
at a deeper level," says T.K. Bhaumik, 48, Senior Advisor (Policy), Confederation of
Indian Industry.
Cut Spending. Sinha must forget about the pump; let alone
pump-priming. Budget 98 has proved that spending more does not kickstart growth. Instead
of announcing hikes in Plan outlays--which are routinely missed--he should put into place
a more effective monitoring system, making loans to states conditional on project
performance. And the allocations to infrastucture ministries could be based on their
ability to carry out pricing reforms.
In fact, getting infrastructure prices right would be the
most effective form of priming the pump as that would unclog investment flows to a sector
with the maximum pull on the rest of the economy. Of course, the transition to a pricing
regime based on principles of cost, rather than cross-subsidisation, cannot be
accomplished overnight, but a time-table can be announced right away for all sectors, the
implementation of which must be monitored by autonomous regulatory authorities.
Anything Sinha can afford to spend must go in investments
that private players can't, or won't, finance. That includes sectors like roads, which are
difficult to price for users, but are vital to create markets. Sinha must also steer clear
of the temptation, which many of his predecessors succumbed to, of using investment as an
excuse to pump money into the government's pet charities: badly-run PSUs.
Privatise. Cross-country experience has, repeatedly,
demonstrated that privatisation succeeds when the process is transparent. If the objective
is to build public support for the programme, the shares of profitable PSUs should be sold
to the public--not to the public sector financial institutions. Loss-makers, on the other
hand, are candidates for strategic sale rather than for phased disinvestment to the
general public.
However, no one will be willing to buy such undertakings
unless they are restructured. Since the Disinvestment Commission has already mapped out
the blueprints for 41 public sector enterprises, all Sinha has to do is to announce his
acceptance of these recommendations and a time-table for their implementation.
Revitalise The Capital Markets. In 1998, the primary markets
saw 19 public issues--that raised Rs 365 crore--compared to 125 (Rs 2,182 crore) in 1997
and 1,444 (Rs 13,887 crore) in 1995. Claims Prithvi Haldea, 48, Managing Director, Prime
Database, which tracks the primary markets: "If the primary market revives, industry
will revive, and vice-versa. It is a circle." Yes, but to revive the markets, Sinha
must focus on reducing transaction costs instead of doling out fiscal sops.
For starters, the Securities Contract Regulation Act, 1956,
must be amended to allow for derivatives trading. Trading would be further facilitated
with the implementation of a uniform rolling settlement-procedure for all stock exchanges,
and the compulsory dematerialisation of securities. Fundamentally, Sinha must yank the
government out of the financial markets, ending, for instance, its stranglehold over the
pension and provident funds business.
Boost Farm Markets To Modern Times. Last year's vegetable
price-hikes punished the government for neglecting rural markets. Organisations that let
people trade the risks of price-volatility cushion farmers and buyers against
fluctuations, allow production-plans to be rationalised, and slash storage and wastage
costs. Such commodity exchanges will provide the farmer with a more efficient alternative
to the public distribution system, and will go a long way in reducing the upward pressures
on procurement prices and, hence, the food subsidy bill. Therefore, Sinha should use farm
futures as the most important part of his rural reforms, and create guidelines to
facilitate their operations.
Sinha must also prevail on his government to delicense and
dereserve all those industries that remain closed to the private sector, and accelerate
the privatisation process wherever it is stuck--as in telecom services and insurance, for
instance. Sadly, everyone is talking about only incremental change, a cautious Budget 99,
and the lack of options. Even if he can look into the future, the finance minister of a
wobbly 13-party coalition will always be under pressure to present a budget for the
polls--not for the economy.
Clearly, there is one unwelcome truth that business is
beginning to believe: that the Vajpayee Administration, given its centrifugal and
centripetal forces, is in no position to take the bold decisions that can grow the
economy. As Sinha gazes blearily ahead, the lack of ammunition in his armoury becomes
clear. Only if corporate India gets a government that is committed to liberalisation, no
matter what the price, can it dream of revival, revitalisation, and renewal. Sadly, Budget
99 isn't being presented by a government that believes. |