For
the last several weeks, people in the rural areas of Maharashtra
have had to endure nine hours of blackouts every day. Those living
in the state's urban areas (Mumbai excluded) have been slightly
more fortunate. They have had to cope with just four hours of
load shedding every day. As for Mumbai, India's commercial capital,
people have been urged-by no less than the state's Chief Minister
Vilasrao Deshmukh and that too on the eve of Maharashtra Day on
April 30-to consume power more sparingly. Elsewhere in the state,
industry-ranging from automobile manufacturers like Tata Motors
and Bajaj Auto to textile manufacturers like Padma Impex and Siyaram
Silk-is bracing up for disruption in supplies and an increase
in the cost of production. "When the lights go off in India's
financial capital and production falters in the nation's most
industrialised state, then there is truly a cause for concern,"
says Jayesh Desai, Director at Ernst & Young, a top consulting
firm.
For a state that long boasted of having one
of the best performing electricity boards (the Maharashtra State
Electricity Board, MSEB) and almost no outages until 1996, the
situation has rapidly deteriorated. The power deficit (mismatch
between demand and supply) has soared to 3,800 mw, and the state
has been reduced to borrowing electricity from the neighbouring
states of Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat. The situation is so severe
that the state government has taken the unthinkable step of pulling
the plug on free electricity to farmers-a huge votebank for all
political parties.
What's behind Maharashtra's power crisis?
Apparently, the controversial Dabhol power project, promoted by
now-bankrupt Enron Corp. The allegation is that ever since Dabhol
started producing power in May 1999, the MSEB went on a holiday
of sorts. Strategic planning was abandoned and the focus shifted
away from new capacity addition in the belief that Dabhol's 2,100-mw
capacity would be sufficient to meet the state's power requirements
in the foreseeable future.
THE MOST REFORMIST STATES |
Which are the
most reformist states in the country? No, we are not talking
about reforms in general, but reforms in the power sector.
A study in March 2005 by credit rating agencies CRISIL and
ICRA have placed Andhra Pradesh (57.03 points, out of a maximum
possible score of 100) at the very top, followed closely by
Gujarat (53.61 points) and Delhi (51.91 points), with Bihar
(5.53 points) and Jharkhand (3 points) bringing up the rear.
That the top-ranked state scores only a few points above the
50 per cent mark points to the distance the sector has still
to travel before it can become truly world class.
So what makes Andhra Pradesh the leader of this pack of
laggards? Despite being deficient in power, it has established
strong regulatory processes, brought down aggregate technical
and commercial (AT&C) losses to 24 per cent (national
average: 45 per cent), jacked up the plant load factor in
its thermal units to a healthy 87 per cent (national average:
70 per cent), and provided timely financial help to both
Central and state utilities, and cross-subsidies. It has
also set up fast track courts to deal with power thefts
and a master trust for meeting pension and gratuity liabilities
of power sector employees. But things could change next
year as the new Congress government's decision to provide
free power to farmers could adversely impact the sector.
Second-placed Gujarat, too, has made progress on subsidies,
distribution reforms, debt servicing and has recorded above
average performance in its generating stations. But its
AT&C loss level of 30 per cent and poor collection from
agricultural consumers are a drag on its performance.
Delhi, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu also score on 51.91, 51.46,
50.94, but their overall performance is dragged down by
low generation parameters, still high AT&C losses and
delays by the state government in implementing some targets
of the Electricity Act of 2003.
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But, as it turned out, the Dabhol project
proved to be a non-starter, and shut generation in January 2001,
because of a stand-off with the MSEB over tariffs. In that time,
of course, the demand for power had continued to soar. "Partly
responsible for the shortage was the industrial revival in the
state and partly, the decision to lower tariffs (by the MERC or
the Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission) and give 80,000
more agricultural connections last year alone," says Girish
Sant, an energy expert working for Prayas, a Pune-based NGO.
Compounding the problem were losses in existing
generation capacity. For example, MSEB's Uran plant has been operating
at less than half its capacity of 900 mw, because of shortage
of gas supplies from the Bombay High and high transmission and
distribution (T&D) losses of 35 per cent. That alone knocked
off 400 mw of the 900 mw that the state gets. In the last two
months, the state government has gone into overdrive and sewed
up as many as eight MoUs with private players for an additional
12,500 mw of power. The problem: It will take five years for that
capacity to come on-stream.
Meanwhile, industries big and small in Maharashtra
are suffering. Consider the powerloom sector in Bhiwandi, home
to 6 lakh units of the 18 lakh in the country. The industrial
town had already been facing five-to-six hours of power cuts every
day, but that has now worsened to as much as 10 hours. For every
one hour of lost production, the industry here loses Rs 42 crore
in sales. Using diesel generator sets only pushes up the cost
of electricity to Rs 7 or 8 per unit. Says M.Y. Momin, President
of the Bhiwandi Powerloom Weavers Federation and the Powerloom
Development and Export Promotion Council: "Since 60 per cent
of the yarn produced in Bhiwandi is exported either directly or
indirectly, the additional cost makes us uncompetitive, especially
against China."
It isn't just the small players who are suffering.
Even big manufacturers are getting hit because the small suppliers
who feed into them with components and raw materials can't afford
to set up captive power units of their own. Says Sanjiv Bajaj,
Executive Director of Pune-based Bajaj Auto: "We haven't
been affected so far largely due to our own internal generation
capacity. But all of our component suppliers are in Maharashtra
and they don't have any (power) backup as such, so it affects
us indirectly."
While a captive power plant ensures supply,
it also adds to the cost. Says Venugopal Dhoot, Chairman and Managing
Director of the Videocon Group, which manufactures Rs 3,000-crore
worth of consumer durables in Aurangabad (Maharashtra): "While
there is load shedding, power is available at a higher cost. Basically,
it's a penalty the company has to pay in order to use extra power.
This increases the cost of electricity by about 10 percent per
annum." Not all of that cost, of course, can be passed on.
THE PRIVATISATION STORY |
India's decade-old but still
hesitant flirtation with power sector privatisation has
produced mixed results. The Orissa model, launched in April
1996, did not really have a happy beginning. Generation,
and transmission and distribution (T&D) were unbundled
and privatised-the Orissa State Electricity Board was unbundled
into Orissa Hydro Power Corporation (OHPC) for hydro generation,
Orissa Power Generation Corporation (OPGC) for thermal generation
and Grid Corporation of Orissa (GRIDCO) for T&D.
AES Transpower (a joint venture of AES Corporation, US,
and Jyothi Structures Limited), which took over CESCO, one
of the four distribution companies spun off from GRIDCO,
in September 1999, left in a huff within a couple of years.
The other three distribution companies-NESCO, WESCO and
SOUTHCO-were taken over by BSES, which is still struggling
to make profits. One of the reasons for the failure of power
sector privatisation in Orissa was the substantial under-reporting
of losses: the government reported only 35 per cent T&D
losses against an actual figure of 50 per cent. But today
Orissa is virtually a turnaround story. The Orissa Electricity
Regulatory Commission, by bringing in a long-term tariff
strategy and various other regulations, has made Orissa
a power surplus state.
The Delhi government pioneered the other model of privatisation
in May 2000. It dismantled the Delhi Vidyut Board and sold
a 51 per cent share each in three distribution companies,
to two privately-owned power distribution companies, BSES
(renamed Reliance Energy in 2003) and Tata Power. The deal:
they would get a subsidy of Rs 3,450 crore for five years
if they could lower the aggregate technical and commercial
(AT&C) losses by 17 per cent. Tata Power's New Delhi
Power Limited has already partially met its target: losses
are down from 53.4 per cent in July 2002 to 35 per cent
in North-East Delhi. Similarly, BSES Rajdhani Power Limited
(BRPL) and BSES Yamuna Power Limited (BPYL) of Reliance
Energy, which provides electricity to 27 lakh customers
in South, West, Eastern and Central Delhi, too, have managed
to bring down the AT&C losses considerably. For instance,
BRPL has brought down AT&C losses from 51.54 per cent
in July 2002 to 40.9 per cent today and BYPL from 63.16
per cent to 50.2 per cent.
In terms of results, the Delhi model seems to be working.
But are other states following it? No prizes for guessing.
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Same Story Elsewhere
The energy crisis in Maharashtra is actually
symptomatic of a nation-wide problem: that of growing demand and
stagnant or, worse, shrinking supply. Take the national capital
for example. Despite generating only 17 per cent of its power
needs (peak demand in Delhi can soar to 3,450 mw per day), a Tata
Power proposal for setting up a 1,000-mw plant in Bhawana in Delhi
has been hanging fire for the last year-and-a-half. "That
despite the fact that the new Electricity Act of 2003 allows private
companies to set up generation units without any clearance from
the state governments," notes Anil Kumar Sardana, CEO of
Tata Power's North Delhi Power Ltd. The result: Delhi is at the
mercy of neighbouring states for supplies.
The story isn't very different in Karnataka
and Tamil Nadu, both important centres of it and automotive industries.
A study done by the Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation shows
that the current demand supply gap of 2,250 mw will jump to 3,450
mw by 2006-07 and 5,300 mw by 2011-12. In Tamil Nadu too, where
TNEB, the state electricity board, generates 9,500 mw, there is
a shortfall of 300 to 400 mw. This year, it plans to spend Rs
400 crore on upgrading its power infrastructure.
According to officials, TNEB has signed an
MoU to set up two joint venture power plants: It will work with
NTPC to set up a 1,000-mw plant at Ennore and with Neyvelli Lignite
to set up another one of identical capacity at Thootakudi. In
addition, the state power board will revive the 1,000-mw Jayamakondam
Power Project that was put on the back-burner some time ago. While
wind farms in Tamil Nadu already generate more than half of India's
wind energy, the state government plans to add another 500 mw
capacity this year. That apart, a 53 mw gas-based unit is to be
commissioned in Ramanathapuram in the state.
Where Tamil Nadu seems to be dragging its
feet is in overhauling its distribution system. The state, however,
has focussed on enhancing its T&D infrastructure and improving
services to customers in Chennai and other key areas. Its collections
are already at around 99 per cent, and T&D losses stand at
around 20 per cent, which is one of the lowest in the country.
The battle for power, say people like Sardana,
has to be fought on two fronts. One is to add fresh capacity to
match the growth in economy (according to some experts, every
1 per cent growth in GDP requires an additional 1.5 per cent of
power supply). The other is to ensure that the existing capacity
is operated at the optimal level. "But these aren't easy
battles to win," says Sardana.
CAN DABHOL SAVE MAHARASHTRA? |
It seems like an opportune
time to talk of reviving the Dabhol Power Project, the Enron-promoted
utility whose premature demise is partly behind Maharashtra's
current power crisis. Although the $2.1-billion (Rs 9,240-crore)
project has an installed capacity of 2,184 mw, it can readily
produce 740 mw. But the question is whether Dabhol's problem
from birth, which is of over-priced power, has been resolved.
The short answer: No. The Maharashtra State Electricity
Board (MSEB) produces 12,000 mw and earns revenues of Rs
12,000 crore. Dabhol's 2,184 MW, in contrast, cost Rs 6,000
crore. Which means Dabhol is almost three times more expensive
than the MSEB. Says E.A.S. Sarma, former Union Power Secretary
and member of the Godbole Committee, which was appointed
to look into the Dabhol project in 2001: "Dabhol is
inherently non-viable because it is a base-load power station
of an inappropriate capacity mode, based on a very expensive
fuel like LNG. Its size and mode of operation do not match
the pattern of demand and its cost is so high that no ordinary
consumer will find it easy to pay." Sarma is right.
At the end of the day, in a commodity industry like power,
the issue is price. And why buy from a white elephant if
you can generate power on your own cheaper?
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Especially when there are fuel shortages.
For instance, at the end of February this year, 24 plants (with
a total capacity of 23,000 mw) had coal stocks of less than seven
days. Karnataka's Raichur Thermal Power Station is a classic example.
The state-owned utility needs more than 21,000 tonnes of coal
every day to fire all its seven units, but currently supply is
restricted to below 5,000 tonnes. That means it can barely operate
two units at a time.
According to a Central Electricity Authority
study, of the 4,300 mw planned capacity in the 10th Plan, almost
2,800 mw is behind schedule because of coal supply constraints.
On the whole, there is a shortfall of around 50 million tonnes
of coal in India today. As far as the other fuels are concerned,
LNG is far too expensive and gas is still a scarce commodity.
In fact, that's something that could derail all the new gas-based
private sector power plants that are coming up.
If, like Andhra and Orissa, other states
have to get their act together, an investment of Rs 9,00,000 crore
will be needed to add 212,000 mw of power that the country will
need by 2012. And it's no more a question of whether India can
rustle up that kind of investment. Rather, the question is how
and when. Otherwise, the country runs a real risk of getting its
growth story short-circuited.
-additional reporting by
Rahul Sachitanand and E. Kumar Sharma
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