Lakshmi Bhindare sits outside her mud hut, clutching a framed photo of her husband. There's a date scrawled in Marathi across the bottom of the picture: 19.1.2006. That was the day when Nanda Nameshwar Bhindare went out to his small 10-acre farm outside this village of Bhadmuri, 160-km southwest of Nagpur.

It was a trip he had made thousands of time before. But this time, he never returned. As they discovered the next morning, Bhindare had consumed pesticide-to kill himself. Unlike the other widows of farmers who killed themselves, Lakshmi chose not to return to her parental home, but stay on in Bhadmuri and take care of her two children and an aged mother-in-law. When the news of yet another farmer suicide went out of the small village, the local tehsildar came visiting and promised to get her the Rs 1 lakh that the Maharashtra government pays to the families of farmers who kill themselves. But, of course, not one rupee has come in the past two months. Lakshmi, barely in her mid-30s, is resigned to her fate; she doesn't know what she and her children will do next.

But she knows one thing: Her son won't grow up to be a cotton farmer and she won't marry off her daughter to a man who has anything to do with cotton. "Kapas (cotton) has ruined my life, it shouldn't ruin the lives of my children," she says in Marathi. Bhindare, a cotton farmer, had killed himself when he couldn't repay the Rs 20,000 he had borrowed from a moneylender because his crop failed. In death, it seems, your loans are forgiven.

Ruined lives: With husband Nanda Bhindare committing suicide, widow Laxmi (holding pic) must now provide for her children and an aged mother-in-law

It is as much ironic as tragic that India's cotton farmers should be in such a sorry state of affairs. With an estimated 9 million hectares under cotton cultivation, India accounts for a quarter of cotton acreage in the world. And although even the 9 million hectares account for just 5 per cent of the country's cultivated area, some 60 million people depend on the crop for their livelihood. Yet, between 1996 (when the first such suicides occurred) and now, about 1,000 cotton farmers like Bhindare have killed themselves in India. The deaths have mainly been in Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh, although there have been reports of farmer suicides from even prosperous areas like Punjab. What's wrong with India's cotton story? There are four villains in the piece-poor yield, poor quality of cotton, poor availability of farm credit and poor cotton marketing-each reinforcing one another. Let's backtrack to understand the problems with cotton.

Not-so-white Gold

India has been growing cotton for several centuries, but it was only in the mid-80s that a large number of farmers shifted from staples like rice and wheat to cotton. The reason was simple: Cotton fetched more rupees per quintal, as implied in the crop's nickname: white gold. To start with, farmers made lots of money. But then gradually, at least in places like Andhra Pradesh's Warangal district and Maharashtra's Vidarbha district, the farmers got sucked into a downward spiral. Unlike rice or wheat, cotton is a high-maintenance crop. It is vulnerable to pests (especially the notorious American bollworm) and, therefore, requires high doses of expensive and harmful pesticide. The problem, however, is that with repeated use, the pests become resistant to the pesticide, requiring higher and higher dosages of the killer spray to produce the same level of effectiveness. (India's cotton farmers spend about $350 million or Rs 1,575 crore annually on pesticides).

What compounds the problem for the average Indian cotton farmer is the fact that his holdings are very small-an estimated average of less than one hectare per farmer. Typically, the farmers buy the cotton seeds, the fertilisers and the pesticides on credit, and usually from the local moneylender at an interest rate as high as 4 per cent a month. So when the crop fails, the farmer falls into a debt trap. Even when he has a good crop, the farmer doesn't make much money. Why? The quality of cotton isn't good enough, and in the cotton business, the price is determined by its staple length (the length of each fibre from the fruit). The higher the staple length, the better the price. Most of the cotton grown in Telengana and Vidarbha is of 26-28 mm staple length and fetches mediocre prices-say, Rs 1,600 per quintal. But cotton with a staple length upwards of 30 mm can fetch more than Rs 3,000 a quintal. The problem: A bare 4 to 4.5 lakh bales of the 243 lakh bales produced in the country last year (the cotton season is between October and September) is of the long staple variety, and their production is limited to some areas of Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa. Why aren't Indian farmers able to produce more and better quality cotton? It goes back to the issue of fragmented land holdings and poor farm practices.

THE PARTNERSHIP SOLUTION

Joining hands: Mill owners in Punjab are adopting villages to up productivity NGOs may see spinning mills as part of the problems plaguing cotton farmers. But the fact is, given bankrupt and apathetic state administrations, corporate India may be the cotton farmer's best hope. Slowly but surely, spinning companies in Tamil Nadu and Punjab have started partnering with the cotton farmers to get not just better cotton, but returns for the farmers. In Punjab, for instance, half-a-dozen mills (including Vardhman Group, JCT and Trident) have been working together since 2000 to help farmers improve cotton yield. The initiative, launched in response to a cotton crisis in the state (production dropped from 25 lakh bales in 1992 to 5.5 lakh bales in 1998-1999), started off as an attempt to identify and showcase the best farmers. The textile mills even roped in SBI Patiala and the Punjab National Bank to hold "credit camps". Starting 2004, though, the initiative moved onto a higher plane, with the consortium adopting whole villages for productivity improvements. In 2004-05, there were 10 such villages, the following year 25, and this year (2006-07) it will adopt 50 villages. The results have been dramatic: Compared to a state average of 575 kg per hectare, the farms in the adopted villages are producing 875 kg per hectare, and state-level production, at 21 lakh bales, is climbing back up. The investment (mainly in scouts and supervisors): Rs 1 lakh per village. Says Sachit Jain, Executive Director, Mahavir Spinning Mills, part of Vardhman: "Money is not the issue. I think what we need is a vision to do it." Happily for India's cotton farmers, some mills in South India have taken to contract farming. The Southern India Mills Association is helping farmers in crop maintenance and integrated pest management. "In the last two years, the yield has increased by 50 per cent (from 6 quintals to 9 quintals per acre) and the cost of maintenance has reduced by around Rs 2,000 per acre," says K.R. Seethapathy, Executive Director, Super Spinning Mills, part of the association. What's more, the quality of cotton has improved. The fibre is more uniform and cleaner, with the trash content (contamination) coming down 2 per cent. So far, Super Spinning has done work in Coimbatore, Dharmapuri, Salem and Theni (all in Tamil Nadu), and Karnataka's Hubli region. That's 15,000 acres of cotton fields. Starting next year, Super Spinning plans to adopt villages (around 20 in Karnataka). "This helps get one variety without any adulteration," says Seethapathy. Also, in 2006-07, it plans to spread contract farming to Maharashtra (between 500 to 1,000 acres) and Andhra Pradesh (around 1,000 acres). Looks like help is on its way to Vidarbha and Warangal.

Enter Bt Cotton

As an answer to India's problems of poor productivity and high pesticide usage, American seed company Monsanto launched Bt cotton in India in 2002 (it was formally approved by the government in 2002, but farmers in Gujarat had been using illegal seeds as early as 2000). Bt cotton is a genetically engineered cotton crop that makes the plant more resistant to the American bollworm. The Bacillus Thuringiensis (hence Bt) gene was first introduced by Monsanto into American cotton and later crossed with Indian cotton. This is how the Bt gene in the cotton plant works: It literally slows down the worm feeding on the leaves of cotton plant by making it lethargic and sleepy. With the bollworm dosing off, the cotton plant grows unharmed and even requires less pesticide (apparently, just two sprays versus the eight for a normal cotton plant).

Downward spiral: Poor yield, poor cotton quality, poor availability of farm credit and poor marketing efforts have all taken their toll on this once-lucrative crop

Needless to say, the popularity of Bt cotton in India has surged. In 2002, Mahyco Monsanto Biotech (MMB) India (Monsanto's seed marketing JV in India) sold 72,000 acres worth of Bt cotton seeds to 55,000 farmers. But last year, more than one million farmers grew 20 Bt cotton hybrids on 3.1 million acres. In the nine states where MMB sells Bt cotton, farmers have reported higher yields. Take the case of K. Ramchandar Rao, a farmer in Ashlapali village in Warangal. Last season, he shifted to Bt cotton and got 12 quintals per acre against the usual 7 quintals per acre. Similarly, in others parts of the country, farmers have reported 15-25 per cent increase in yields. So why aren't our farmers laughing all their way to the bank?

There are three major problems with it. One is of fake seeds. In the name of Bt cotton, a lot of poor quality seeds are being sold to the farmers, who, confident in their belief that their crop is indestructible, do not take adequate measures to protect it. Last season in Vidarbha, for instance, nearly half of all Bt cotton seeds sold are said to be fake. The second problem is that the genuine seeds are terribly expensive. A 450-gm packet of Bt cotton seeds from MMB costs Rs 1,800 compared to an ordinary seed packet of Rs 300-400. Why do Bt cotton seeds need to cost six times more? "The pricing philosophy is based on sharing the value that products and technology deliver to farmers," says a Monsanto spokesperson. In other words, Monsanto takes a cut from the farmer for higher productivity. (By that logic, any software vendor that improves productivity at a company should be charging differently, and any drug company that saves you a day's loss of work should be charging not for the drug, but taking a cut on your day's earnings.)

The seed price wouldn't in itself be a problem, but for another reason. While Bt cotton is bollworm resistant, it does not offer protection against other pests. So it's still possible for a Bt cotton farm to be ravaged by some other disease. For instance, unseasonal rains in Vidarbha last November plagued the cotton crop with a condition locally known as lalya, a reddening of the leaves. The farmers, who believed that the Bt plant was indestructible, did nothing to correct the condition until it was too late. As a result, instead of their usual four quintals per acre, they managed an average of two. Besides, Bt cotton does not translate into higher-and, hence, more lucrative-staple length. For that, the soil environment has to be rich. And in India, over use of pesticides has poisoned cotton farm soils.

Quality pays: Majority of the cotton grown in the country is of mediocre quality. Only 4-4.5 lakh bales of the 243 lakh bales produced fetch the best price

World Trade Dynamics

Finally, world trade has a role to play in India's cotton misery. To be sure, American cotton is of longer staple length and free of contamination such as human hair and dirt (another factor that drives down cotton prices) and preferred by the cotton mills, but it is made competitive by subsidies (annually of about $2.3 billion or Rs 10,350 crore). Therefore, while imports from the US are just 5 lakh bales (versus a domestic production of 243 lakh bales), they represent a big loss to the local farmer in terms of opportunity. At Rs 8,000-9,000 a bale, it represents lost sales of Rs 400-450 crore a year. "What does the Chinese government do to promote its cotton industry? It raises local tariffs against imported cotton. In India, why are tariffs on cotton at just 10 per cent?" asks Vijay Jawandhia, an activist and farmer in Wardha. (Raising the cost of good quality, imported cotton is not the solution; it will hurt India's garment exports.)

The other issue is of minimum support prices (MSP) to cotton farmers. Those in Vidarbha and Warangal complain that cotton support prices are collapsing. P. Mohan Reddy in Gorlavedu village in Warangal says that he received only Rs 1,900 per quintal last year as against Rs 2,500 the year before. "The Cotton Corporation of India purchases at least in Warangal have collapsed," laments T. Ramesh Babu, Chairman of the Agricultural Marketing Committee (AMC) for the district. He says that in the last full year (October 2004-September 2005), CCI, which is the government's central cotton buying agency, picked up 528,682 quintals brought into the AMC. This year until March, it had picked up only 13,459 quintals of the 1,170,662 brought into the AMC. "Overall, we have purchased 11.5 lakh bales so far, compared to the 25 lakh bales last year, and we have asked purchases to be kept open till the very end," says C.S. Teotia, Director of Marketing at CCI, adding that his corporation has been buying even low-grade cotton to help farmers. CCI, he says, plans to more than triple cotton exports this year to 35 lakh bales.

Even as the different players in the cotton drama pass the blame around, some farmers are reducing their dependence on cotton. For example, this season, Warangal's Rao has planted cotton in just two acres compared to four last year. Instead, he has increased maize cultivation on his 15-acre farm. "In maize, I invested Rs 6,000 for three acres on seeds, pesticides and labour, and I'll get a return of Rs 45,000. In cotton, I'll invest more than Rs 15,000 for two acres, and my return will only be Rs 45,000," he explains. Even his neighbour from nearby village, Reddy, is contemplating switching from cotton altogether. Both of them don't want their next generations to be farmers.

Across the border in Maharashtra's Dorli village, where 35 of the 40 families live below the poverty line, signs of 'for sale' have sprung up. "We want to sell the village because we will not commit suicide, because we want to live," says Chandraprakash, the village sarpanch. Ironic that a crop that once brought an entire nation together (Mahatma Gandhi's chosen symbol of freedom movement was the charkha) should now be the seed of misery and discontent in the Indian heartland.