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Picking up steam: A Corus
plant in the Netherlands |
There has been much stock
market consternation over the prices that India's ambitious corporate
groups have been willing to pay for their foreign acquisitions.
Tata Steel's stock on the Bombay Stock Exchange plunged 7.5 per
cent on the day it announced that it had won Anglo-Dutch steel maker
Corus on an additional premium of 33.63 per cent over its initial
offer of 455 pence a share. At $12.1 billion, the Tata Group's Corus
purchase is the biggest ever in corporate India. Unimpressed, Standard
& Poor's put Tata Steel's long-term corporate credit rating
on credit watch. Similarly, when Kumar Mangalam Birla announced
that his aluminium company Hindalco was acquiring North America's
Novelis for $6 billion (including debt on Novelis' books), the Indian
buyer's stock fell more than 7 per cent. Why is there a
disconnect between managements and shareholders over the perceived
value of these acquisitions? To put it simply, most institutional
shareholders are focussed on short-term earnings, whereas the
managements, especially the ones controlled by business families,
think long term. Now, there's a second reason why deal valuations
are soaring. Increasingly, companies from the BRIC nations (Brazil,
Russia, India and China) are competing with each other for assets
that can fetch them global scale. A simple reason why Tata Steel
had to increase its Corus offer was the fact that Brazil's Companhia
Siderurgica Nacional (CSN) decided to join the fray. In July 2002,
Corus had unveiled a plan to merge with CSN but that never materialised.
It's not unusual for big M&A battles to be hard-fought.
But these days, the distance that some aggressive bidders are
willing to go has increased. Blame it on BRIC. Robust growth in
their own economies is helping BRIC Inc. grow faster than their
global peers. As a result, global investors are willing to bankroll
them for acquisitions that are much bigger than the buyers' own
balance sheets. Therefore, as long as the BRIC economies keep
growing, there is little chance of deal valuations-at least, of
those assets perceived as strategic-cooling. And there's little
chance of that happening anytime soon.
Within days of Hindalco announcing its Novelis buy, there were
reports that Russia's aluminium maker Rusal would make a counter-bid
for the us-Canadian company. China's China National Petroleum
Company has routinely pipped India's ONGC Videsh at the post for
oil assets in parts of Central Asia and Africa. As is evident,
BRIC Inc. is in a tearing hurry to grow. Corus catapults Tata
Steel to the #5 position globally; Novelis has, by the Aditya
Birla Group's own estimation, fast-forwarded Hindalco by 10 years
in terms of downstream capacity. Stiffer competition will, however,
mean that the buyers have to work that much harder to make the
deals deliver. Should it happen that these deals don't fetch the
promised value, the market will correct; buyers and lenders will
be more cautious, and valuations will start looking like something
that the buyer's shareholders are more comfortable with. Until
then, BRIC vs BRIC will continue to delight the shareholders selling
out, and not the ones buying in.
Let Gas Be
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Not enough to fuel power:
A Reliance Industries rig |
The government's attempt
to secure gas supply from Reliance Industries' kg basin for the
power sector is entirely misplaced. Yes, power shortages are acute
and securing gas will help quick capacity additions. However, such
a move, if anything, will only distort the fuel market and push
back reforms in the power sector. Here's why. It is a fact that
pushing reforms in states to enable transmission and distribution
(T&D) losses and thereby, restoring viability of the sector,
is not enough. It would be the best choice had the problem not been
so acute, and the sector any less critical to the economy. Hence,
the growing power needs of the country in the medium term need to
be met largely by capacity addition in the public fold, as reforms
alone can ensure greater private play. And here, the government
has failed, given its latest report card-during the Tenth Plan period
(2002-2007), capacity addition at 23,000 mw is short by 40 per cent.
But that is not reason enough to spoil the evolving gas market.
For, directing supplies to the power sector may result in electricity
generation at a cost higher than that from alternate sources like
coal and hydel. In turn, the power deal will leave an expensive
and indelible imprint on the gas market, where demand outstrips
supply by half. This is all the more relevant since the government
has so far planned for future capacity addition largely on coal
as fuel, where the costs are lower. This is amply reflected in
the recent ultra-mega power bids, where prices were as low as
Rs 1.20 per unit. Furthermore, the urgency to commission new capacities
is not driven by industrial demand-industry is largely powered
by captive capacity.
The bottom line is one of simple economics: supply without a
price does not make for a commercial deal. If Reliance's gas supply
is secured, it must be competitive vis-à-vis coal. After
all, for the Eleventh Plan period, of the 68,000 mw planned capacity
addition, only 2,000 mw is expected to operate on gas. Since the
principal gas buyers-fertiliser and power sectors-are in government
domain and not in the pink of health, the government has even
less reason to intervene.
Nurturing the Entrepreneurial Spirit
|
A TiE meet: Everyone
wants to be an entrepreneur |
There
are reports that the government is planning to set up an incubation
fund to provide finance and mentoring to entrepreneurs with bright
ideas. On the face of it, no one in his right mind can argue with
this. Any programme that institutionalises access to venture capital,
which is distinct from bank or development finance, can only give
the economy a huge fillip.
But some caveats are in order. The first
question that arises is: who will be in charge of running this
fund? Bureaucrats and regular bankers are trained to be prudent
and risk-averse. This makes them particularly unsuited to be in
charge. One must quickly add here that there are many honourable
exceptions to this rule. But it's also a fact that top-level appointments
in public sector financial institutions depend crucially on political
patronage. This is what gives rise to a queasy feeling.
Venture capital, by its very nature, cannot be disbursed along
prudential lines. The venture capitalist has to make an often
subjective call on which ideas will work and which won't. Also,
only one or two out of every 10 ventures financed really take
off, and many of the others have to be written off as duds. Most
venture capitalists depend on a combination of scientific projections
and their gut feel while backing projects. Giving bureaucrats
and their political masters discretionary powers over vast sums
of money carries with it the inherent risk that the entire exercise
may degenerate into a game of patronage.
Is it, then, a good idea whose time hasn't yet come? No. Business
Today feels that the idea, laudable as it is, will also become
feasible if the government follows the public-private partnership
model while implementing it. The government will do well to involve
established venture capitalists in this programme. This way, it
will retain a say over the broad direction of the venture, but
not an overriding influence in the actual disbursal of funds.
It can even follow the template created by The Indus Entrepreneurs
and the Band of Angels where venture capitalists and other like-minded
investors come together to finance and mentor enterpreneurs.
Also, it makes immense sense to route a part of the corpus through
institutes like the IITs, the IIMs and other centres of higher
learning, which should also be encouraged to set up their own
venture capital funds. It bears reminding that Harvard University
is also one of the world's largest venture capitalists. A few
Indian institutions are now considered worthy peers of that august
institution. This is another facet that they should try to emulate. |