Paula
Abdul, pop star- turned-choreographer- turned-designer and one
of the judges on American Idol, is arguably the most popular element
of the hit reality show on the Fox network in the US. In the 2005
edition, though, there's something else that's threatened to steal
the limelight from Abdul-the cup she periodically sips from. The
cup has Coca-Cola screaming all over. As do the walls of the room
in which the contestants wait to get on stage. It's called-what
else-the Coca-Cola room. With the soft drink giant making more
of a splash on American Idol than most of the wannabe songsters,
it isn't surprising that some cynics in the us have dubbed American
Idol an infomercial for the world's greatest brand.
Now such product placements aren't exactly
alien on Indian small screens, but don't expect to see the judges
on American Idol's desi avatar, Indian Idol, sipping on Coke as
they suffer countless aspirants. That's because the company with
the world's second most recognisable symbol (after The Cross)
these days prefers to lie low in the Indian market. One reason
for doing so could be the matter of the Indian operations running
up losses of close to Rs 1,000 crore. Hindustan Coca-Cola Beverages,
the holding company for Hindustan Coca-Cola Bottling India and
Hindustan Coca-Cola Marketing, had accumulated losses worth Rs
996 crore as on March 2005. This includes a Rs 539-crore loss
in 2004-05 and Rs 457 crore in the year before that. In both these
years, sales virtually stagnated (at Rs 1,356 crore and Rs 1,331
crore, respectively). The year-ending March 2005-06 won't be any
better, as sales of carbonated soft drinks have dropped by 20-22
per cent again. The company's annual report for 2004-05 alludes
to the fact that if non-alcoholic beverages were admissible under
the provisions of the Sick Industrial Companies Act, Coca-Cola
India could have been declared a sick company.
|
Pepsi's Bakshi: Fruit juices and snacks
business have kept it from going flat |
It's not only Coke that's in the doldrums.
Rival Pepsi, too, is feeling the heat courtesy a shrinking market.
In 2004-05, soft drinks sales dropped to 2002-03 levels of 400
million cases, and per capita consumption stagnated at around
8.7 bottles. It is yet to touch double digits. If Pepsi hasn't
collapsed on the sickbed, it's because the company has been able
to absorb the shock better, courtesy its thriving fruit juices
(a Rs 400-crore industry growing at 30-40 per cent a year) and
snacks business (contributing around 40 per cent to the top line).
What might have also worked in Pepsi's favour is that throughout
this period of crisis, it did not compromise on its share of voice.
It ran some of its best campaigns ever with Bollywood stars Amitabh
Bachchan, Shahrukh Khan, Kareena Kapoor, Preity Zinta and Saif
Ali Khan, and via Sachin Tendulkar in cricket, Pepsi also invested
heavily in cricket. The company spent around Rs 400-450 crore
between 2002 and 2005 as against Coke's Rs 350 crore. Coke's new
President Atul Singh, in fact, admits that cutting ad spends was
a big mistake. "Once out of sight, you are out of mind and
that's what happened in Coca-Cola's case."
Clearly it's the spectacular failure of the
world's best brand (for three years running, according to Interbrand's
survey), valued at $67 billion or Rs 3,01,500 crore-Pepsi is valued
at just $12 billion or Rs 54,000 crore-that's difficult to ignore.
Singh says he doesn't want to "defend things that went wrong
in the past. I would rather focus on the future and as I see it,
it is very bright". That may be the best option for Singh,
yet it's difficult not to look back and figure how the soft drinks
giants got it wrong. Consider: Coca-Cola has invested over Rs
5,000 crore in India in a span of 12 years against Pepsi's Rs
3,000 crore over a period of 18 years. Coke's investment not only
makes it one of the biggest foreign investors in India, it also
makes India a foreign market where the Atlanta-headquartered soft
drinks major has made maximum investments. Yet, India remains
a bleeding spot for the company.
This is the second time Coke's India business
has gone awry since its return to the country in 1993 after a
rather unceremonious exit in 1977. It had tidied up its flailing
business by the late 90s and was even flourishing at the turn
of the century. Along with Pepsi, Coca-Cola had consolidated the
Indian soft drinks market, which doubled in size from 200 million
to around 400 million cases between 1999 and early 2003. Per capita
consumption had risen to 9.5 bottles in 2003 from four in 1994.
However, it still remained much behind the US (per capita consumption:
800) and even neighbouring countries like China (28) and Pakistan
(24). In 2003, when consumption in urban markets was booming like
never before, Coca-Cola decided to take the plunge into the hitherto
untapped rural market. The idea was to push volumes and expand
the consumer base.
Different Strokes
Their contrasting entry strategies
partly explain Coke and Pepsi's performance in India. |
In 1993, when
coca-cola re-entered India after an unceremonious exit in
1977, the cola market was its to take. And it did, by buying
out the then cola kings, Parle's Chauhan brothers, who owned
a clutch of brands, including Thums Up, Limca, Gold Spot,
Citra and Maaza. Coke outbid Pepsi by paying (some say, vastly
overpaying) Rs 350 crore for the Parle brands, and immediately
cornered 60 per cent of the market. But there were problems:
with the deal came Parle bottlers and the brothers, who remained
stakeholders and management participants. "It was a step
taken in desperation and Coke paid the price for its oversight
for almost a decade," says a former Coke executive. When
Coke tried to bring in its brand of professionalism to the
inefficient bottling operations, the bottlers were miffed.
To end the tussle, Coke started buying the bottling plants;
an exercise that ended in 2001. It, now, owns about 41 of
the 58 plants. The exercise cost Coke around Rs 3,500 crore
and it spent another Rs 1,000 crore to modernise the plants.
As it turned out, it was an expensive way to build one's bottling
operations. Pepsi, which didn't buy market share but instead
came in as a partner to Punjab Agro Industrial Corporation
and Voltas in 1988, set up its own bottling plants at an investment
of Rs 2,500 crore. Today, Pepsi owns 19 of its 39 plants,
most of which have broken even. Coke's losses in the bottling
business stood at Rs 996 crore, at the end of March 2005. |
"At that time it seemed like a winning
strategy," recalls a former Coke executive. Indeed, with
around 70 per cent of the country's total population and over
40 per cent of its total disposable income, rural India seemed
an ideal destination. However, rural consumers being extremely
price conscious, making products more affordable seemed obligatory.
Hence, prices were slashed across categories by 25 per cent on
an average and a new price point of Rs 5 for 200 ml bottles against
Rs 7 in 2002 was introduced. This was followed up with a massive
marketing and advertising drive. Remember the Thanda Matlab Coca-Cola
campaign with Bollywood star Amir Khan?
"We knew the rural strategy was suicidal,
but being the competitor we had no option but to follow suit,"
shrugs Rajeev Bakshi, Chairman, PepsiCo. If Bakshi had said this
then, he would have only been ridiculed because rural markets
started delivering from day one. The consumer base expanded by
80 per cent in just a couple of months and volumes were up 39
per cent in the first half of 2003-04. Even the urban market grew
30 per cent.
And then came a bolt from the blue.
On August 5, 2003, The Centre for Science
and Environment, a Delhi-based NGO, convened a press conference
where it alleged that 12 top brands of Coca-Cola and Pepsi contained
poisonous pesticides. In a high-profile counter, both Coke and
Pepsi fought the allegations tooth and nail, but that didn't help
too much. Sales plummeted by around 35 per cent in the second
half of 2003-04. Since then the two companies have been running
into one problem after the other: These include protests relating
to water exploitation in Kerala (Coke's Palakkad plant in Kerala
remained shut for most of 2004 and early 2005), Andhra Pradesh
and Rajasthan, and other health and pollution-related problems
in Tamil Nadu, up and Uttaranchal.
|
Hot or cold? Coke's rural foray proved
an overkill |
The controversy hasn't quite died down since
then-and has, in fact, resurfaced in the land of The Real Thing.
Last fortnight, 50,000 students of the University of Michigan,
us, forced campus authorities to suspend the sale of all Coca-Cola
products. Their grouse: The soft drinks major is draining local
groundwater in India and causing severe water crisis for local
communities. A California-based activist, Amit Srivastava, is
spearheading this campaign; he intends to take it to other educational
institutions in the US and the UK to stir public opinion. "It
(Coca-Cola) is destroying livelihoods, stealing water and poisoning
land. That is the story of Coca-Cola in India," he told mediapersons
in the US. Coke's Singh says: "These activists are leading
a false campaign against us. None of his allegations has been
proved. We are working with local communities to clear their doubts
on these issues."
What's worsened the situation for Coke in
India was the gradual realisation that rural penetration is not
a good business strategy. "We had ended up subsidising the
rich for the poor," says Bakshi. The affordability drive
did bring in 39 per cent volume growth, but value-wise, the industry
grew only around 20 per cent. "What had happened was that
the urban consumer who earlier bought bigger bottles and paid
a higher price had now switched over to Rs 5 and Rs 6 categories,"
says Coke's Singh. Urban household consumption was also on the
decline because of the controversies. By the end of 2004-05, the
soft drinks industry was back to square one.
|
Coke's Singh: Despite losses, the company
is planning fresh investments |
To salvage their sinking bottom lines, the
two companies were forced to raise their prices twice in 2005
(see Back To Square One). And now, the duo is speaking in unison
once again. "Rural markets in India are all but a sham,"
says Bakshi. "We will have to have different price points
according to the paying capacity of the target consumer rather
than having one price for all," adds Singh.
Piled-up losses and a drop in volumes notwithstanding,
it isn't quite the end of the road for the cola majors. "Consumers
have a very short memory. Once the two companies get their act
together, they will regain their lost constituency," says
Y.L.R. Moorthi, Professor, Marketing, IIM-B. Experts also maintain
that the recent controversies wouldn't have eroded their brand
value much. "If a few hiccups here and there were to mar
a company's brand equity, Coca- Cola wouldn't have remained the
world's top-most brand," points out Ramesh Jude Thomas, Equitor
Consulting, an Interbrand affiliate in India. Both, however, recommend
re-jigging of the product portfolio, particularly in the case
of Coke. Even the Interbrand survey suggests that the company
must tap the evolving health and energy drinks market. Coke's
Singh, in fact, is already talking about it. "We are making
a fresh investment of $120 million (Rs 540 crore) in India to
expand our product categories. Health and wellness will be a priority,"
he says. Pepsi has also lined up investments of around $300-400
million (Rs 1,350-1,800 crore) for the next four to five years
and it plans new launches in non-cola categories. Indeed, there's
plenty to look forward to for the cola giants: low penetration,
a burgeoning middle class, rising per capita incomes and a growing
economy are all triggers in favour of an inevitable boom in soft
drinks consumption. Unless of course rural Indian folk decide
that carbonated sugar water doesn't enhance their life in any
great manner and their urban counterparts are convinced that pesticide-laced
drinks aren't quite their poison.
|