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O.P. Lohia, MD, Indo Rama: Back in the
reckoning |
Four
years ago, you could have written off Indo Rama Synthetics' Managing
Director Om Prakash Lohia as yet another has-been. The East Asian
crisis had just struck and Lohia, a wannabe player in the polyester
market, was watching his dreams go quickly sour. Lohia, whose polyester
and fibre plant near Nagpur had just gone on stream, hadn't been
ready for what happened: an almost overnight collapse of the global
polyester market and widespread dumping by polyester manufacturers
in Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia, depressing prices in the Indian
market. Margins in the polyester business plummeted from over $1,000
a tonne in 1994-95 to about $200. Plus, there were the high interest
payouts and depreciation on Lohia's new plant. In March 1998, Lohia
ended the financial year with a loss of Rs 87 crore and followed
it up the next year with an even bigger loss of Rs 159.6 crore.
Back then, many blamed Lohia's audacity for
his travails. With some reason. Lohia had chosen to enter a business
where he would face arguably India Inc.'s most formidable opponent-Reliance.
It was a classic David vs Goliath story. Indo Rama vs Reliance.
Back in 1995, when Lohia set up his 63,000-tonnes-a-year plant,
Reliance, with a capacity of 500,000 tonnes, already controlled
over 50 per cent of the market. And thanks to its scale of operations
and the soft market following the Asian crisis, smaller players
in the polyester business were going belly-up in rapid succession.
Companies that plunged deep into the red included Modern, Sanghi,
and Century Enka. Some of these never recovered. Others, like Raymond
Synthetics, Orissa Synthetics, and RPG's India Polyfibres, were
snapped up by Reliance.
ROLLER-COASTER RIDE:
How Indo Rama's fortunes yo-yoed over the
years. |
1989
Starts spun yarn production with 20,000 spindles
1992
Increases capacity to 65,000 spindles, and acquires land near
Nagpur for a new plant
1995
Starts polyester production with 63,000 tonnes per annum
1997
Increases polyester capacity to 2.5 lakh tpa; plans a 350,000-tpa
PTA unit
1998-99
The South East Asian crisis hits hard; PTA plans shelved, makes
Rs 159 crore in losses
1999-00
Restructuring helps Indo Rama bounce back, reduces losses to
Rs 7 crore
2000-01
Demand recovers, is back in the black with a net profit of Rs
19 crore
2001-02
Restructures business, cuts costs and improves efficiency. Net
profit jumps to Rs 41 crore
2002-03
Plans to hive off spun yarn business, increase polyester capacity,
and make value-added products |
Only one lived to tell the tale. Cut to 2003,
and Indo Rama Synthetics is doing very well, thank you. It has a
21 per cent marketshare; its Nagpur plant is operating at 30 per
cent more than its capacity; turnover at the end of this year could
top Rs 2,500 crore and profits Rs 140-150 crore. What's more, Indo
Rama's return on capital employed-a good measure of how efficiently
a business is running-is 20 per cent. Oh, and just in case you missed
it, it still makes polyester chips, yarn, and fibre. So how did
Lohia do it? How did he overcome being nearly wiped out by the crisis
of the nineties and the smothering might of his arch-rival. Ask
him that question and you'll get a truism. "If you are strong,
nobody can stop you," says he.
Playing With Fire
Not so long ago, strength was probably something
Lohia was praying for. Back until 1994, Indo Rama led a peaceful
existence. It bought cotton, viscose, and PSF, and manufactured
spun yarn, blended and pure. Its bottomline was healthy and it paid
its shareholders dividends regularly. But Lohia, who set up Indo
Rama in 1989, was bitten by the bug. Egged on by the dismantling
of the licensing regime, he ventured on to Reliance's turf by setting
up a polyester plant in Butibori near Nagpur and drew up plans to
manufacture purified terephthalic acid (PTA), the crucial raw material
in polyester production, in a joint venture with Mitsui and Itochu,
both of Japan. The second move, especially, was worse, since it
would end Reliance's status as the only PTA manufacturer in the
country.
Lohia had three sound reasons for the two moves.
First, he believed that polyester demand would soar if the government
corrected-as it did to some extent-a tax structure, which overwhelmingly
favoured cotton over polyester. He also believed that Reliance,
with 500,000 tonnes spread over three locations at that time, wasn't
as formidable a rival as it was made out to be. And thirdly, he
believed it was unhealthy for the industry to have just one supplier
of the crucial raw material.
But just when he had it all mapped out, things
began to fall apart. With the onset of the Asian crisis, which knocked
Indo Rama's bottomline, came other problems. Lohia's proposed PTA
plant, which had a layout of Rs 2,700 crore, began facing-some say,
inexplicably-several hurdles. Clearances got delayed and Haldia
Petrochemicals, whose plans were formulated later, marched ahead.
Lohia admits to a certain wariness on the part of potential lenders.
In a seemingly unrelated development, labour unrest surfaced at
Butibori. Things came to a head in 1997, when Lohia finally shelved
the PTA project, offering by way of explanation that his wish to
have a second PTA manufacturer was anyway being fulfilled by Haldia
Petrochemicals.
By the end of 1999, Indo Rama's fortunes began
to turn. The Asian crisis ebbed and a wave of consolidation-primarily
Reliance gobbling up Raymond Synthetics, Orissa Synthetics, and
India Polyfibres (adding to its earlier acquisition of ici's fibre
plant)-eased the situation. In 1999-2000, Indo Rama made a remarkable
recovery with a loss of only Rs 7 crore, after making a provision
of Rs 100 crore in depreciation. Nevertheless, the spectre of doom
was never quite dispelled, with Reliance leveraging its PTA strength
to sell the final product at low prices. Margins continued to rule
at around $200 a tonne.
Fighting With Fire
All eyes were on Shailendra Tandon, who joined
Indo Rama as its President & Chief Financial Officer in January
2001. In his previous job as corporate treasurer of ICI India, Tandon
had played a key role in restructuring the beleaguered multi-product
conglomerate, and had struck the deal to sell its 30,000 tonne-a-year
fibre plant at Thane to Reliance in 1993. Not keen to relive the
experience, he along with Lohia got down to revamping the company
with, you guessed it, Reliance as the benchmark.
Tandon and Lohia went in for a massive cost
reduction, targeting raw material, financing costs, wages, and stores
and spares. High-cost borrowings were substituted with low-cost
ones and working capital needs were brought down. In what was a
novel move at that time, Indo Rama outsourced its entire it operation
to Accenture to be able to focus on its core functions.
The market too helped. Since late 1999, polyester
demand has begun to grow again. With rising cotton prices and falling
polyester prices, polyester now constitutes 50 per cent of the fibre
market compared to 20 per cent when Indo Rama entered the business.
That ratio is expected to move closer to the global figure of 57
per cent polyester and 43 per cent cotton. Total polyester demand
in 2003-04 is expected to grow to about 2 million tonnes from 1.5
million in 2002-03. Against this total capacity, including Reliance's
800,000 tonnes a year and Indo Rama's 250,000 tonnes a year, just
about matches the current demand with some of the less fortunate
manufacturers unable to produce at the rated capacity. The margins,
which continue to rule at the post-Asian crisis low of $200 a tonne,
act as barriers to new entrants enabling existing players to benefit
by raising capacity utilisation. ''The frontline players are operating
at higher than the rated capacity and fresh capacity is essential
if they are to meet the increased demand,'' says a Mumbai-based
analyst.
According to Lohia, the high capacity he set
up was crucial to Indo Rama's survival as marginal players got wiped
out. He also cites his ability to foresee market trends, commitment,
and a sharp focus on the cost side of the business; he chose to
set up a captive 60-mw power plant rather than depend on the Maharashtra
State Electricity Board. "People didn't believe me earlier
and said I will be wiped out by Reliance. Internally, too, there
were doubts on our survival. But we never gave up," crows Lohia.
Some think Reliance's massive diversification-into
energy and then telecommunications-actually helped Indo Rama. Fibre
and textiles, which account for about 10 per cent of the group's
turnover, are no longer seen as crucial to its overall scheme of
things. "Polyester is no more as important to Reliance as it
was four-to-five years ago. It won't mind if someone else caters
to the demand that Reliance doesn't care to tap," says a Mumbai-based
analyst. Admits an Indo Rama insider: ''Reliance and we are not
exactly brothers in blood. But we have a healthy working relationship,
which marks a change.'' Lohia says he pre-empted this and ''could
see Reliance's focus turning away from this business in 1995 itself."
With Big Brother-despite a three times bigger
polyester capacity and 54 per cent share of the market-growing benign,
Indo Rama wants to grow bigger. It is adding 175,000 tonnes to its
capacity at the Butibori plant and an additional yarn capacity for
20,000 tonnes. There has also been a change at the front end. "Earlier,
they used to declare their prices only after Reliance. Now, they
don't wait," says Bharat Sheth of Mumbai-based Quest Securities.
Barely four years ago, that would have been
unthinkable. Don't cheer yet, though. Polyester staple fibre is
still taxed at twice the rate of cotton and polyester yarn at three
times, inhibiting demand growth and the prices for its major input,
PTA, have been soaring (PTA prices have risen 50 per cent between
January 2002 and now). That's a double-whammy for Indo Rama. Remember,
Reliance, which makes its own PTA also sells it to others-and Indo
Rama is one of its customers. Lohia may have brought his company
back from the brink, but the road ahead isn't smooth.
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