|   There 
              was attitude written all over the décor of Leghorn's India headquarters. 
              Spunky, brash, cool-all very denim. Leghorn, after all, was the 
              Original brand of jeans, the stuff of American legend, second skin 
              to the horsebacked hardheads out West who'd come to father a nation 
              of frontier-pushing individualists. The very first. The link that 
              couldn't be torn asunder, the great equaliser-in the sack, or outside, 
              as seen in that all-knowing smile of daredevil infamy.  The brand's approach in India had been appropriately 
              collegiate, as reflected in the office environment. The brand DNA 
              was the same, just expressed in the local idiom. So there were Indian 
              hellraisers with Michael Jordan hairdos, college slangs like 'fucchas' 
              (freshers) screaming for attention, even guitar-shaped commodes 
              to strum out just one thing. All very indigo.  But somewhere deep in the inner recesses of 
              Leghorn's cavernous youthdom, was located the 'Fix'. This is where 
              the Indian unit's three top men, all in their mid-thirties, huddled 
              together every Thursday afternoon to split hair and ideas over black 
              coffee and nuts. In an annual market of 15 million pairs of branded 
              ready-to-wear jeans, Leghorn was doing just half a million. Simply 
              put, Santosh Gupta, T.K. Bose and Vikas Prabhu needed to yank up 
              domestic sales volumes, without losing the premium edge of Leghorn's 
              cult appeal amongst the brand-savvy. The mass moves had barely begun, 
              and loyalists had started protesting. It was a thinner knife-edge 
              than they'd thought. This wasn't going to be an early Thursday.  "When we launched Leghorn in India in 1996," 
              began brand general manager 'Ticks' Bose, "we had this clear-cut 
              agenda to penetrate the market top-down-international advertising, 
              high-end four-digit pricing, exclusive showrooms..."  "Too bad we stayed 
              on 'top' for way too long, Ticks," interjected Gupta, the managing 
              director, in his inimitably deep baritone. "By 1999, denim 
              was out, at least for the post-college crowd, and had it not been 
              for our Rs 1,200-2,000 Drapper range of semi-formal work trousers, 
              we'd have had it. Check out the research, and you'll find that premium 
              jeans were a no-hoper." 
               
                | The aim now was to stretch margins thin, 
                    but spread them across many more legs. It was, of course, 
                    a gambit. |  Denim had made a mild comeback with officegoers, 
              but the market was largely teens, still. Gupta was proud of his 
              'value re-engineering' efforts of the past three years. Indigenisation 
              was a key part of it. The set of domestic suppliers had been widened, 
              with denim and accessories now sourced from several vendors. Part 
              of the attraction in working with Leghorn as a vendor was the promise 
              of 'global supplier' status, which meant huge export orders. Even 
              otherwise, Leghorn's domestic operations were coming along nicely. 
              The supply circuit had been clipped short, nodes of 'wastage' had 
              been ripped out, and the actual manufacturing made more efficient. 
              A year or more, and India could become an export base for other 
              markets. The more relevant upshot: cheaper made jeans.  "Unmatchable value for the young guy who's 
              scrounging for his prized pair," exulted Gupta, "that's 
              the way to go." Prabhu, the marketing general manager, nodded. 
              Research had indicated that the brand's core target buyer (aged 
              15-19) had bought his last pair of jeans for less than Rs 1,000, 
              and given Leghorn's rank atop the aspiration curve, might easily 
              be tempted by a three-digit price bait. This study had been the 
              reason that Bose had pushed for a switch to 'reasonable pricing' 
              as the main element of Leghorn's marketing strategy (which was meant 
              to go top-down, originally, in any case).   The aim now was to stretch margins thin, but 
              spread them across many more legs. It was, of course, a gambit. 
              Grabbing volumes quickly is always something of a sweat run. But 
              they knew that they could heave a nice long sigh of relief once 
              they got Leghorn past the 1-million-unit mark. That was 'critical 
              mass' in the jeans business.  The original range of jeans, however, had to 
              stay premium (above Rs 1,200). A few discount sales would do, but 
              it was best to entrust the price-baiting task to another sub-brand. 
              So in early 2002, Leghorn had launched its new Feever collection, 
              positioned as 'street-wear' for the college youth, to rope in the 
              sub-Rs 1,000 jeans buyer. Feever's prices ranged from Rs 800 to 
              Rs 999. Meanwhile, distribution was expanded to multi-brand stores, 
              even in mofussil towns and localities.   Yet, Prabhu had a strange feeling in his bones 
              about all this. Lasso, an early-entrant brand of American jeans 
              with even heavier cowboy imagery, had gone all out for volumes to 
              the dustiest of cornershops with 'irresistable' prices-and lived 
              to regret it, sweating in the late 1990s to get the brand's gleam 
              back. As Bose put it, "If the wrong guys are getting into your 
              brand, you get out-it's that simple."  More worryingly, several of India's domestic 
              jeans labels were actually ascending the value curve-moving prices 
              higher and higher, on the strength of brands they'd managed to give 
              distinctive characters to within just a few years. There was No 
              One, with its Calvin Klein-ish feminine sensuality ('Nothing comes 
              between me and...'). For the male, there was ShrinkWrap, with its 
              clear wear-em-forever proposition. And also Brute, with its bare-chested 
              machismo. Indian brands, all-moving up, and prospering.  Prabhu mumbled their names, and then cleared 
              his throat to articulate his qualms: "My problem is... their 
              prices are converging with ours. And they still have good volumes. 
              Maybe we need to re-examine the assumption that this is a relatively 
              brand-insensitive market where volumes can only be built through 
              price-point enablers."  There was a moment's silence, before Gupta 
              spoke. "These local brands can't be stronger than Leghorn, 
              if that's what you're suggesting..."  "No, but they do have strong target-specific 
              appeals-I mean, that should be our game. Are we getting too caught 
              up in all these simple price-value equations?" posed Prabhu.  "Value is what we have to deliver," 
              replied Gupta, firmly.  "I'm worrying about brand value, actually. 
              The touchy-feely stuff. I fear Leghorn is failing its loyalists. 
              The guys who rave about the brand-as a brand. The guys who don't 
              pack their hearts and minds into their wallets. The guys who'll 
              absolutely not wear any other jeans under any circumstances."  Gupta thought for a while, and turned to Bose, 
              "What d'you say, Ticks?"  "Brand integrity first-no question there. 
              My gut's with him."   Gupta pursed his lips. He had also heard a 
              few ex-IIM batchmates grumble about Leghorn losing some of its 'statement 
              value', but had decided to treat the feedback lightly, unless other 
              team members were to report the same. Well-now they had.  "What should we do?" asked Gupta. 1 2 |